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Wage Theft as Public Larceny
Elizabeth J. Kennedy†
INTRODUCTION
Even the palm trees were fakes. Details of the FBI
takedown of Florence Bikundi included all the hallmarks of a
massive fraud: a convicted imposter with multiple aliases,
millions of dollars and jewelry stashed in dozens of bank accounts,
the sprawling suburban mansion, and luxury cars set against an
ornate, yet artificial, landscape.1 Ms. Bikundi, the owner of
multiple health care agencies, allegedly billed Medicaid over $75
million for fictitious home care services, and her arrest was
heralded as the largest health care fraud takedown in the history
of the District of Columbia.2 Florence Bikundi was, herself, a
counterfeit. Ten years earlier, as Florence Igwacho, a native of
Cameroon with limited medical training, she “simply pretended to
be a nurse,” working under the name of an actual registered
nurse, Karen Awah, and caring for patients at two Baltimore
hospitals.3 Igwacho’s scheme collapsed when a colleague, staffed
alongside the real Karen Awah at a separate hospital, recognized
† Associate Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Loyola University
Maryland. The author thanks Erin Girbach for her research assistance, Sarah Leberstein
and Richard Bardos for their insights and expertise, and the editors of the Brooklyn Law
Review for their diligent work and helpful suggestions.
1 Press Release, FBI, More Than 20 People Arrested Following Investigations
into Widespread Health Care Fraud in D.C. Medicaid Program (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2014/more-than-20-people-arrested-follow
ing-investigations-into-widespread-health-care-fraud-in-d.c.-medicaid-program [http://per
ma.cc/24KM-QYEP] [hereinafter FBI Press Release]. The case is ongoing, and the most
recent docket entry was March 7, 2016. Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Bikundi,
47 F. Supp. 3d 131 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2016) (No. 1:14-cr-00030-BAH), ECF No. 474; see also
Jay Korff, Florence Bikundi Arrested in Medicaid Fraud Crackdown, WJLA (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://wjla.com/news/crime/florence-bikundi-arrested-in-medicaid-fraud-crackdown-100429
[http://perma.cc/57A2-R8FP].
2 FBI Press Release, supra note 1.
3 Imposter Registered Nurse Sentenced to 2 ½ Years for Practicing Nursing at
Two Baltimore Hospitals, MD. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (July 8, 2003),
https://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2003/0708a03.htm [http://perma.cc/T3ZE-PGG8]; David
Kohn, Practical Nurse Gets Prison for Faked Credentials, BALT. SUN (July 10, 2003),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-07-10/news/0307100240_1_mercy-medical-registered-
nurse-practical-nurse [http://perma.cc/U9WD-6QE7].
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and reported the scam.4 Florence Igwacho was sentenced to two-
and-a-half years in prison for preying on people that Judge Lynn
Stewart described as “vulnerable and helpless.”5 Upon Ms.
Igwacho’s release, she changed her last name to Bikundi (she also
goes by Florence Ngwe) and, according to prosecutors, crafted a
sophisticated and lucrative scheme to prey on not only the elderly
and infirm but also the U.S. taxpayer.6
Considerable governmental resources are marshaled to
identify, investigate, arrest, and prosecute Medicaid fraud rings
like the one allegedly orchestrated by Ms. Bikundi.7 The
government may levy criminal penalties, such as a fine or
imprisonment, and demand that a defendant forfeit any illegally
obtained assets.8 But what if Ms. Bikundi had stolen money not
from taxpayers but from her employees? She could accomplish
such a heist by paying her workers less than the minimum wage or
by misclassifying them as independent contractors (and pocketing
4 MD. OFF. OF THE ATT’YGEN., supra note 3.
5 Kohn, supra note 3.
6 FBI Press Release, supra note 1. As U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr.
explained in a press release issued following Bikundi’s arrest, “This fraud diverts precious
taxpayer dollars, drives up the costs of health care and jeopardizes the strength of a
program that serves the most vulnerable members of our society.” Id.
7 No less than 10 governmental agencies collaborated in the investigation.
These included
the FBI’s Washington Field Office; the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of Inspector General; the U.S. Secret Service; the Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit of the District of Columbia’s Office of the Inspector General; the
Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation; the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement [] Office of Homeland Security Investigations []; the Office
of Labor Racketeering and Fraud Investigations, Office of Inspector General,
Department of Labor; the Social Security Administration, Office of Inspector
General; and the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Maryland Attorney
General’s Office. Assistance was provided by the District of Columbia’s
Department of Health Care Finance and other agencies.
FBI Press Release, supra note 1.
8 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., REPORT TO
CONGRESS, FRAUD PREVENTION SYSTEM, SECOND IMPLEMENTATION YEAR (2014),
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/fraud-rtc06242014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6XWV-XM6H].
Many state attorneys general have offices dedicated to overseeing the forfeiture of assets in
connection with cases of Medicare and Medicaid fraud. With respect to Medicare, for fiscal
year 2013, over $30 million in forfeited assets and over $14 million in civil penalties were
deposited into the Medicare Trust Fund. DEP’T OFHEALTH ANDHUMAN SERVS. & THEDEP’T
OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 5 (2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2013-hcfac.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q468-8SKA]. One of the many examples included in the report of successful
investigations and prosecutions of individuals engaged in health care fraud is the co-owner
and operator of three Miami-based pharmacies, who was found to have made “illegal
kickback payments to guarantee a stream of beneficiary information, which was used to
submit false and fraudulent claims by the pharmacies to Medicare and Medicaid.” ANNUAL
REPORT FORFISCALYEAR 2013, supra, at 18-19. He “was sentenced to 168 months in prison,
ordered to forfeit over $23 million, and ordered to pay a $100,000 fine.” Id. at 18-19.
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what otherwise would be mandated overtime and payroll taxes).9
What if these critical home care services for the elderly and
disabled were in fact provided, just not fairly compensated?10
While the arrests, searches, and seizures in the case of
Florence Bikundi may have demonstrated that the federal
government is “aggressively fighting back to protect the U.S.
taxpayer and the integrity of [the government’s] federal health
care programs,” there has been no such vigilance when it comes to
protecting the low-wage worker and the integrity of workplace
enforcement systems.11 Although the illegal underpaying of
employees—known as “wage theft”—is estimated to cost U.S.
workers up to $50 billion per year (and to have collateral
economic impacts on local and state economies), “the penalties
under federal law for even willful and repeat violations are
minimal.”12 In contrast to the hefty fines imposed for indirectly
stealing from taxpayers through Medicaid fraud,13 the maximum
civil penalty for directly stealing from employees (such as by
repeatedly or willfully failing to pay minimum wages) is only
$1,100.14 In the courts of law and public opinion, forging invoices
for fake services is considered criminal, while fraudulently
underpaying for real services, while also illegal, is perceived by
some as a rational, if unscrupulous, business decision.15 The
9 A 2008 study of workers in New York City found that the home care industry
had one of the highest rates of overtime violations by employers. Nearly 83% of home care
workers surveyed experienced overtime violations, and 84% worked “off-the-clock”
without receiving pay for part of their working time. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKING WITHOUT LAWS: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
LAW VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 24, 30-31 (2010), http://www.nelp.org/
content/uploads/2015/03/WorkingWithoutLawsNYC.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ANN-LMFM].
10 Press Release, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, Home Care Workers File Wage-
Theft Class Action Against NYC Agency (Feb. 12, 2013), http://nelp.3cdn.net/
e68b8d0101558a23_xdm6b3fez.pdf [http://perma.cc/2D6T-F4LQ].
11 FBI Press Release, supra note 1.
12 Brady Meixell & Ross Eisenbrey, An Epidemic of Wage Theft Is Costing
Workers Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Year, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 11,
2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/epidemic-wage-theft-costing-workers-hundreds/
[http://perma.cc/2D2S-6QJF].
13 The punishment for a felony conviction under the False Claims Act is up to
five years imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012)) and a fine of $250,000 for an individual
and $500,000 for a corporation—or $100,000 for an individual and $200,000 for a
corporation for a misdemeanor conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)-(c) (2012).
14 Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 12; 29 U.S.C. § 216 (e)(2) (2012). The
FLSA provides for liquidated damages equal to two times the amount of wages illegally
withheld. Under some parallel state wage and hour laws, a liquidated damages amount
equal to treble the amount of illegally withheld wages may be available. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (authorizing private actions and specifying the recovery available).
15 The Importance of Combatting Wage Theft: Senate Labor and Industry
Committee Hearing on Raising the Minimum Wage, 114th Cong. 5 (May 5, 2015) (written
testimony of Michael Hollander, Staff Attorney, Community Legal Services, Inc.),
http://clsphila.org/sites/default/files/issues/CLS%20Testimony%20on%20Wage%20Theft%20
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particular demographics of the workforce and the organizational
contours of the industry help explain this disparity and unlock
potential solutions.
The vast majority of home care workers are low-income
women of color who earn less than $13 an hour, a wage that
places them near the bottom of the economic ladder.16 Home care
itself, like most domestic work, is associated with gendered,
voluntary care roles and “women’s work,” which results in a
devaluation of wages as compared with other, nongendered
manual labor.17 The demographic profile of domestic workers
reflects structural issues of racial discrimination and immigration
to%20Senate%20Labor%20and%20Industry%20Committee%20Hearing%20-%205-2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3D5S-VJVL] (“From a practical standpoint, a 25% penalty makes wage
theft a rational business decision. To illustrate this point, imagine an employer with 10
employees, each of whom he fails to pay $2000. In total, the employer has stolen $20,000
from his employees. If 8 of the 10 employees sue in court and win, the employer will have to
pay out 8 * $2500 ($2,000 + $500 penalty) = $20,000. In other words, even if 8 of 10
employees are victorious in court, the employer pays out no more than he would have paid
were he to have paid originally. Only if 9 of 10 employees successfully sue an employer for
wage theft does the employer suffer any economic penalty.”).
16 LINDA BURNHAM & NIK THEODORE, NAT’L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALL., HOME
ECONOMICS: THE INVISIBLE AND UNREGULATED WORLD OF DOMESTIC WORK 18-21
(2012) (“Seventy percent of domestic workers surveyed are paid less than $13 an hour
by their primary employer, and less than 9 percent are paid more than $18 per hour.”);
see also DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED & DATACENTER, HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS:
INSIDE NEW YORK’S DOMESTIC WORK INDUSTRY 2, 7, 16 (2006) [hereinafter HOME IS
WHERE THE WORK IS] (93% of New York City’s domestic workforce are women of color);
PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., HOME CARE AIDES AT A GLANCE (2014),
http://phinational.org/sites/phinational.org/files/phi-facts-5.pdf [http://perma.cc/2NWM-
8HEX] [hereinafter PHI, AT AGLANCE].
17 See Kristi L. Graunke, “Just Like One of the Family”: Domestic Violence
Paradigms and Combating On-The-Job Violence Against Household Workers in the
United States, 9 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 131, 155 n.136 (2002) (finding domestic workers’
wages to be “often below or near the minimum wage”); Peggie R. Smith, Laboring For
Child Care: A Consideration of New Approaches to Represent Low-Income Service
Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583, 591 (2006) (linking low pay for a job to the
perception of the job as “women’s work”); HOME ISWHERE THEWORK IS, supra note 16,
at 16. A survey of hundreds of workers in Maryland found that 51% of those surveyed
reported earning less than Maryland’s minimum wage. GREGORY GAINES ET AL.,
MONTGOMERY CTY. COUNCIL COMM. ON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., WORKING
CONDITIONS OF DOMESTICWORKERS INMONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND 8, 13 (2006),
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/COUNCIL/Resources/Files/agenda/cm/2006/060
516/20060516_hhs01.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8FM-7RX7]. Hila Shamir, in her work on
the distributive effects of employment law in markets of care, noted that the exclusion
of domestic workers from employment law distributes the cost of care to domestic
workers themselves, who subsidize the cost of their work to primary market workers.
Hila Shamir, Between Home and Work: Assessing the Distributive Effects of
Employment Law in Markets of Care, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 404, 453-54
(2009). Only two percent of domestic employers surveyed in Park Slope, Brooklyn,
reported providing full medical benefits to their nannies, and another three percent
reported helping with medical bills. PARK SLOPE PARENTS, 2015 NANNY COMPENSATION
SURVEY 2015, at 44 (2015), http://cdn.parkslopeparents.com/images/2015NannySurvey
Results_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/2JH4-PAV4].
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policies.18 A complex racial and ethnic hierarchy, which reflects
historical trends in migration, exists throughout the domestic
work industry. A century ago, white European immigrants often
worked as “live in” domestic workers.19 As opportunities expanded
in manufacturing and other industries with economic pathways
toward higher paying work, white workers left the home care
profession and domestic workers became more likely to be
married women of color performing “live out” day work.20 The
scale of the domestic work industry also shifted, as more women
entered the paid workforce overall, which created a greater
demand for paid domestic workers to provide in-home care for the
young, elderly, and disabled.21
Home care workers exemplify the “feminization of
migration,” a set of trends that motivate women from poor
countries to migrate to the United States and other developed
nations in response to the increasing demand for paid care
work.22 Women who immigrate to the United States face a
constellation of barriers to enforcing their rights: isolation,
communication difficulties, and persistent exclusion from federal
and state workplace protections, among others.23 Home care
workers who report mistreatment by employers cite their race,
immigration status, and language skills as significant factors
contributing to the abuse.24
Given these limitations, and based on an understanding
that two-thirds of the home care industry is financed by tax
dollars—primarily through Medicare and Medicaid—this article
advances several new strategies for deterring wage theft and
recovering unpaid wages.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the
demographic, structural, and regulatory forces currently
propelling the growth of the rapidly expanding commercial home
care industry. Part II introduces the incidence of wage theft and
18 See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 9, at 37-38.
19 Christine E. Bose, The Interconnections of Paid and Unpaid Domestic
Work, 8 S&F ONLINE, no. 1, Fall 2009, http://sfonline.barnard.edu/work/bose_01.htm
[http://perma.cc/FYK4-CGA8].
20 MIGNON DUFFY, MAKING CARE COUNT: A CENTURY OF GENDER, RACE, AND
PAID CAREWORK 28-30 (2011).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Graunke, supra note 17, at 150-72 (documenting the various problems
facing workers).
24 See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 9, at 22. Of the workers who reported
mistreatment, one-third (33%) felt that immigration status was a factor in their
employer’s actions, one-third (32%) felt race was a factor, and 18% felt language played
a role. HOME ISWHERE THEWORK IS, supra note 16, at 2.
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its impacts on home care workers, quality of care, and local
communities. Part III examines the existing legal strategies for
enforcing workplace standards, as well as the factors that limit
the effectiveness of those tactics. Part IV proposes three
alternative enforcement angles that could be used by workers,
consumers, and advocates. First, the article considers whether
wage theft by a Medicare or Medicaid participating home care
employer might trigger liability under the qui tam provision of
the False Claims Act. Second, the article considers whether the
receipt of tax dollars imposes fiduciary duties on home care
employers and whether this “employer-as-fiduciary” theory gives
rise to viable claims by workers (and consumers and taxpayers)
when employers illegally underpay or misclassify their employees.
Lastly, this article suggests leveraging the authority of the
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector
General to exclude home care employers from participating in
federal health care programs (i.e, Medicare and Medicaid) upon a
wage theft conviction.
This article’s proposals for collaborative enforcement
among providers and consumers of home care would augment the
existing “bottom up” strategy and leverage the unique nature of
home care work. Wage theft’s impacts on the home care industry
extend well beyond its immediate victims and destabilize the
quality of care and the financial stability of local communities.
While fake palm trees and forged identities may readily capture
the attention of federal agencies, unchallenged wage theft siphons
off an even greater amount of taxpayer dollars and public trust.
Given the persistent limitations of federal and state law in
combating wage theft, the alternative enforcement mechanisms
proposed in this article have the potential to break new ground in
enforcing standards and improving working conditions in this
important, growing industry.
I. THE COMMERCIALHOME CARE INDUSTRY
America’s aging population is growing. The country’s first
wave of “baby boomers” will soon turn 70, and the number of
seniors (currently around 40 million) is expected to double by
2050.25 As more and more of these older adults attempt to “ag[e]
25 JENNIFERM. ORTMAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. P25-1140, AN AGING
NATION: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3WZ-PZSY]. With
people living longer, the demand for caregiving is expected to grow significantly. An
estimated 27 million Americans will need direct care by 2050. U.S. DEP’T OFHEALTH AND
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in place”26 within their own homes, rather than in nursing
facilities or hospitals,27 many require help from personal care
aides with daily activities such as dressing, bathing, toileting,
housekeeping, shopping, and visiting doctors.28 Others require
more significant medical assistance that is better provided at
home than in a hospital.29 In those cases, home health aides,
many of whom are certified, are employed to insert catheters,
administer enemas, turn clients in bed, tube feed, insert
suppositories, check vital signs and functions, and administer
medications.30 Most aging adults have complex medical and
personal needs to which family members and neighbors are
unable to attend.31 Other informal strategies, such as receiving
“Meals on Wheels” or episodic support from charitable
organizations or volunteers, are also insufficient for people with
complex needs. As a response to this clear and growing demand
HUMAN SERVS., THE FUTURE SUPPLY OF LONG-TERM CAREWORKERS IN RELATION TO THE
AGING BABY BOOM GENERATION 3 (2003), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/72961/
ltcwork.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4S3-GXS4].
26 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define “aging in place” as
“[t]he ability to live in one’s own home and community safely, independently, and
comfortably, regardless of age, income, or ability level.” Healthy Places Terminology,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyplaces/
terminology.htm [http://perma.cc/HKF7-E9J2] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
27 According to a survey by the AARP, nearly 90% of Americans age 50 and
older expressed a desire to remain in their homes as long as possible. Brief of
Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellants and Reversal at 5, Home Health Care Ass’n. v. Weil, 76 F. Supp. 3d 138
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 15-5018), 2015 WL 848081.
28 Personal care aides’ duties may also include preparing meals, light
housework, bill paying, and running errands. Molly Biklen, Healthcare in the Home:
Reexamining the Companionship Services Exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 113, 132 (2003).
29 Home care refers to any care received within an individual’s home for causes
including but not limited to acute illness, long-term health conditions, permanent disability,
or terminal illness. See generally S. Mitchell Weitzman, Legal and Policy Aspects of Home
Care Coverage, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 3-4 (1992) (specifying the practical distinctions
between home care and home health care and the policy implications of those distinctions).
Specifically, home health care is the part-time administration of medical services by skilled
medical staff that take place at a client’s home instead of at a hospital or skilled nursing
facility. When prescribed by a physician, this type of care is covered under Medicare benefit
Part A. What Part A Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-
covers/part-a/what-part-a-covers.html [http://perma.cc/PF4C-HR7F] (last visited Mar. 4,
2016). Examples of such treatments include wound care, nursing care, nutritional therapy,
physical therapy, injection administration, speech-language pathology services, and
continued occupational services. What’s Home Health Care?, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/home-health-care/home-health-care-what-
is-it-what-to-expect.html [http://perma.cc/H2FL-3MHB] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); see also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &MEDICAID SERVS., NO. 10969, MEDICARE AND HOME HEALTH CARE
7-9 (2010), https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/10969.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6JH-5GYY].
30 Biklen, supra note 28, at 132.
31 Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid
Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92 IOWA L. REV 1835, 1844-45 (2007).
524 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
(as well as the significant costs of care facilities), the home care
industry has undergone a dramatic transformation, both in size
and structure.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has identified the home
health care industry as having “the fastest growing employment
of all industries.”32 With over two million home care aides and
80,000 employers,33 the industry bears little resemblance to that of
the 1960s and 1970s.34 At that time, a home care worker was more
likely to be a “companion”—someone who provided fellowship,
company, and general assistance, rather than certified nursing
care.35 Since neighbors, family members, and untrained “elder
sitters” provided most of the in-home assistance at that time,
formal employers of home care workers were few.36 This once
informal sector has experienced precipitous growth, restructuring,
and regulation, as well as significant labor shortages and high
32 Richard Henderson, Industry Employment and Output Projections to 2022,
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (Dec. 2013) (emphasis added), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/
2013/article/industry-employment-and-output-projections-to-2022-1.htm [http://perma.cc/
WZ2N-5B8A].
The “home care industry” is comprised of two formally defined industries, Home
Health Care Services (NAICS 621610) and Services for the Elderly and Persons
with Disabilities (NAICS 624120). It also includes home care aides working
directly for private households under publicly funded programs or private-pay
arrangements—workers usually not captured in government surveys.
PHI, AT AGLANCE, supra note 16, at 4 n.1.
33 PHI, AT AGLANCE, supra note 16, at 1.
34 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Work,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2011-0003-9830 [http://perma.cc/
4T64-JW6U] (“The home care industry . . . has undergone dramatic expansion and
transformation in the past several decades. . . . In the 1970s, many individuals with
significant care needs were served in institutional settings rather than in their homes and
their communities. . . . Today, direct care workers are for the most part not the elder sitters
that Congress envisioned when it enacted the companionship exemption in 1974, but are
instead professional caregivers.”); PHI, AT A GLANCE, supra note 16, at 4 n.2 (“Home care
aides include workers classified under two occupational codes within the home care and
personal assistance industry: Personal Care Aides (SOC 39-9021) and Home Health Aides
(31-1011). Additionally, large numbers of aides are employed by consumers under publicly
financed programs that allow program participants to hire their own personal care workers.
Beyond that, hundreds of thousands of additional aides are thought to work directly for
individuals and their families under private arrangements in what is often referred to as
the ‘grey market. ’ ”).
35 Smith, supra note 31, at 1860-61. As counsel for amici noted,
[H]ome care workers often perform the same tasks that workers employed in
nursing homes do, but without the close support from and immediate access
to health care professionals that their counterparts in hospitals, nursing
homes, and assisted living facilities receive—and without the wage and hour
protections that their counterparts enjoy.
Brief for Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute et al., supra note 27, at 9 (footnote omitted).
36 Smith, supra note 31, at 1844-45.
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turnover,37 each of which has had profound effects on the
industry’s ability to deliver quality care to consumers.38
Home care workers, most of whom are female
immigrants, earn on average just over $21,000 a year, with a
median hourly wage of only $9.83.39 These numbers are inflated,
however, given that a significant percentage of home care
workers also suffer from wage instability and are often unable to
find full-time work.40 More than 20% of home care workers and
their families rely on public assistance, and that percentage is
likely to grow as states expand their Medicaid programs under
the Affordable Care Act.41
As the size of the home care industry has changed, so has
its structure.42 What was previously an industry made up of small
agencies has now witnessed large-scale consolidation, franchise
37 Kelly Kennedy, High Turnover Affects Home Health Care Quality, USA TODAY
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-15/home-
health-care-turnover-quality/53109424/1 [http://perma.cc/9H6R-NX8A] (“High turnover[,
which] is directly related to low wages,” results in a greater turnover of caregivers;
“employers who must pay to constantly retrain employees; and employees who are not
able to advance in their careers . . . .”).
38 Robyn I. Stone, The Direct Care Worker: The Third Rail of Home Care
Policy, 25 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 521, 525 (2004) (noting that “problems with
attracting and retaining direct care workers may translate into poorer quality and/or
unsafe care, major disruptions in the continuity of care, and reduced access to care”
and that “reduced availability and frequent churning of homecare workers may affect
clients’ physical and mental functioning”).
39 Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014, U.S. BUREAU OFLAB. STATS.,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes399021.htm [http://perma.cc/ZJ7D-K4EQ] (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016). There is significant variation depending on where home care workers
live. Annual earnings for home care workers ranged from $17,710 in West Virginia to
almost $30,080 in Alaska. Occupational Employment and Wages, supra. “One in four
[home care aides] live in households below the federal poverty line . . . .” PHI, AT A
GLANCE, supra note 16, at 2. The 2015 federal poverty guideline for an individual is
$11,770, and for a family of three, it is $20,090. 2015 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Services, ASPE (Sept. 3, 2015), http://aspe.hhs.gov/
poverty/15poverty.cfm#guidelines [http://perma.cc/7UAK-JMNY].
40 PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., PAYING THE PRICE: HOW POVERTY
WAGES UNDERMINE HOME CARE IN AMERICA 1 (Feb. 2015), http://phinational.org/
sites/phinational.org/files/research-report/paying-the-price.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3VY-
ZZKL] [hereinafter PHI, PAYING THE PRICE] (noting that only 40% of home care
workers are employed full-time, resulting in an average annual wage of only about
$13,000).
41 PHI, AT AGLANCE, supra note 16, at 2.
42 Not discussed in this article is the issue of “joint employers” in the home care
industry, for which there are two models of third-party arrangements: traditional agency-
based care and consumer-directed care. Agency-based care is a model in which a home
care agency hires, trains, supervises, and assigns workers to provide services to a
particular client, for which the agency is reimbursed with public funds. Under this model,
the agency is considered an employer for purposes of the FLSA. In a consumer-directed
care model, the client hires the home care worker and supervises the care. Under that
model, the client may be considered an employer under the FLSA. The agency may still
qualify as a “joint employer,” however, in which case both the agency and the client could
be liable as employers under the FLSA. Smith, supra note 31, at 1863.
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agreements, and even publicly traded home care chains. Each
agency is funded through a complicated system of public funding
and private payments. Two of the most critical sources of funding
for home care services are Medicare and Medicaid.43 While
Medicare is the largest single financier, accounting for 41% of all
home care services,44 Medicaid actually provides a more generous
benefit, though it is limited to adults who lack the financial
resources to pay for care themselves.45 Significantly, the structure
of Medicare payments for home health care changed in 2000 from a
retroactive, cost-based system to a prospective payment system.46
43 AMY TRAUB & ROBERTHILTONSMITH, DEMOS, UNDERWRITING BAD JOBS: HOW
OUR TAX DOLLARS ARE FUNDING LOW-WAGE WORK AND FUELING INEQUALITY 11 (2013),
http://www.demos.org/publication/underwriting-bad-jobs-how-our-tax-dollars-are-funding-
low-wage-work-and-fueling-inequali [http://perma.cc/74MN-BGGL]. The Medicaid program,
through which the federal and state governments provide health care and services to low-
income individuals, is subsidized by the federal government and administered by the
states. A state participating in Medicaid must offer home health services as part of the
program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xvii)(7) (2013). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Service project that total national expenditures for health care in 2012 were $2.79 trillion,
with $77.8 billion of that specifically spent on home health care. Anne B. Martin et al.,
National Health Spending In 2012: Rate Of Health Spending Growth Remained Low For
The Fourth Consecutive Year, 33 HEALTHAFF., 67-77 (2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/33/1/67.full.pdf+html [http://perma.cc/WSH2-2Y89].
44 NAT’L ASS’N FOR HOME CARE & HOSPICE, BASIC STATISTICS ABOUT HOME
CARE 3 (2010), http://www.nahc.org/assets/1/7/10hc_stats.pdf [http://perma.cc/G8KY-
G9HR]. Medicare operates on a home health prospective payment system (PPS). Using
a case-mix adjuster to analyze a patient’s specific needs and characteristics, the PPS
sets a specific payment rate for the care of individual clients, which is paid per 60-day
episode. CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE
HOME HEALTH STUDY: AN INVESTIGATION ON ACCESS TO CARE AND PAYMENT FOR
VULNERABLE PATIENT POPULATIONS 4-6 (2014), http://op.bna.com/hl.nsf/id/mwin-
9r7lvt/$File/20141125%20CMS%20Home%20Health%20Study%20RTC%20final%20(4).pdf
[http://perma.cc/5L5V-5P55]. Though the case-mix formula is adjusted for regional
differences in wages, this distinction is made based on a national survey of wages.
SCOTT R. TALEGA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42998, MEDICARE HOME HEALTH BENEFIT
PRIMER: BENEFIT BASICS AND ISSUES 12 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42998.pdf [http://perma.cc/9P4T-ULUR].
45 BRIAN O. BURWELL & WILLIAM H. CROWN, PUBLIC FINANCING OF LONG-
TERM CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES (1994), https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/public
-financing-long-term-care-federal-and-state-roles#home [http://perma.cc/PS68-F9C7]
(“Thus, the Medicaid program provides a more generous benefit package for long-term
care services than the Medicare program, but these services are limited to persons who
lack the financial resources to pay for their own care.”). Moreover, the combination of
federal and state outlays of Medicaid for home health care provides more total funding
than Medicare. BASIC STATISTICS ABOUT HOME CARE, supra note 44 at 3. “Other public
funding sources for home health include Medicaid, the Older Americans Act, Title XX
Social Services Block Grants, the Veterans’ Administration, and Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Services . . . .” Id.
46 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/HEHS-00-9, MEDICARE HOME HEALTH
CARE: PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM WILL NEED REFINEMENT AS DATA BECOMES
AVAILABLE 3 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00009.pdf [http://perma.cc/UN32-
8EC5]. Medicare’s revised Home Health Prospective Payment System features
standardized 60-day episode payment rates and national per-visit rates. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH ANDHUMANSERVS., CTRS. FORMEDICAID ANDMEDICARE SERVS., MLNMATTERS 2-
3 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
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As the home care industry has expanded, franchised,47
and consolidated,48 direct care workers have begun to organize
and demand higher wages, greater benefits, and improved
working conditions.49 Underscoring these demands has been a
clamor for federal and state wage and hour standards. Until 1974,
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which established a “floor”
for wages and a “ceiling” for hours, completely excluded domestic
workers, including home care workers, from coverage for minimum
wage rates, maximum hours, and overtime compensation.50
In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA to extend these
minimum standards to most domestic workers but carved out a
narrow exemption for employees providing “companionship
services” to the elderly or disabled.51 As discussed above, this
narrow exemption was perhaps justified by the relatively
informal, “companionship” nature of home care work as
performed in 1974, but it is no longer appropriate given the size
and scope of today’s home care industry.52 This language
MLNMattersArticles/downloads/MM8969.pdf [http://perma.cc/YC5J-MFFC]. Payments to
home health agencies are estimated to decrease by approximately 1.05% in calendar
year 2014. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicaid
and Medicare Servs., Medicare Finalizes Home Health Payments for 2014 (Nov. 22,
2013), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2013-Press-
releases-items/2013-11-22-2.html [http://perma.cc/A4Z2-CUS5].
47 DORIE SEAVEY & ABBY MARQUAND, CARING IN AMERICA: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE NATION’S FASTEST-GROWING JOBS: HOME HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE
AIDS 14-25 (2011), http://www.phinational.org/sites/phinational.org/files/clearinghouse
/caringinamerica-20111212.pdf [http://perma.cc/KH66-PG8N] (“[O]ne of the fastest
growing players in the in-home care sector is for profit franchise chains that provide
non-medical personal assistance services. This sector is highly fragmented with over 35
different franchise brands.”).
48 PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., THE IMPENDING THREAT TO THE NYC
HOME CARE SYSTEM 1 (2013), http://phinational.org/sites/phinational.org/files/medicaid-
redesign-watch-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/UMV2-XAPB] (“Already, private and community-
based home care provider agencies are beginning to fold, merge, or be purchased.”).
49 Hina Shah & Marci Seville, Domestic Worker Organizing: Building a
Contemporary Movement for Dignity and Power, 75 ALB. L. REV. 413, 430, 445 (2012)
(detailing the contemporary movement of domestic workers, which includes
organizations such as Caring Across Generations, the National Domestic Worker
Alliance, Domestic Workers United, Hand in Hand, and La Colectiva).
50 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 162 (2007).
“Domestic workers” were defined as those employed by households (as opposed to
agencies or businesses) in domestic service occupations, such as cooks, housekeepers,
maids, and gardeners. Id. at 166-71.
51 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 29 C.F.R.
§ 552 (2015). Congress also created an overtime exemption for “live-in” domestic service
workers. Id. While domestic workers are slowly achieving more universal coverage
under the FLSA, regulations promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act explicitly exclude domestic workers “[a]s a matter of policy.” Policy as to Domestic
Household Employment Activities in Private Residences, 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2014).
52 Home Care Ass’n v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The
growing demand for long-term home care services and the rising cost of traditional
institutional care have fundamentally changed the nature of the home care industry.”).
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remained untouched and unchanged for nearly 40 years until the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued final regulations,
effective January 2015, that significantly narrowed the
“companionship exemptions.”53
Recognizing that home care work “merits . . . fundamental
wage guarantees,” and acknowledging consumers’ need for a
“stable and professional workforce [that would allow] them to
remain in their homes and communities,” the DOL’s new rules
extend basic minimum wage and overtime protections to the
majority of home care workers.54 Not surprisingly, home care
employers challenged the promulgation and implementation of
these new rules, but on August 21, 2015, the D.C. Circuit upheld
the DOL’s rules and reversed two decisions issued by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia that had previously
struck down the revisions.55 Although the decision is a certain
victory for home care workers, the revised companionship
regulations themselves do not ensure stable coverage under the
FLSA. Home care workers will still face significant barriers to
enforcing these newly acquired and legally affirmed rights.
Closing the gaps in workplace laws for home care workers is an
important first step, but as low-wage workers in other industries
have experienced, an unchecked epidemic of wage theft by
employers can undermine any statutory or regulatory gains.
53 “The final rules define ‘companionship services’ as the provision of fellowship
and protection.” Fellowship and protection will mean many different things to different
people. For some, it may include conversation, playing games or making crafts, or
accompanying the person to appointments or social events. The rule defines it as “engaging
the person in social, physical, and mental activities,” while protection involves physical
presence to monitor the person’s safety and well-being. “Care” may be included in
companionship services, but only to the extent that it occurs in connection with the
provision of fellowship and protection. Moreover, this ancillary care (assistance with daily
living or ADL) is limited to 20% of the companion’s weekly hours per care recipient. If a
home care worker spends more than 20 hours a week delivering ADL, such as showers,
toileting, and feeding, an employer (including “third-party employers, such as home care
agencies,” and any state agency found to be an employer) will not be able to claim an
exemption from the FLSA overtime rules for such employees. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT,
FEDERALMINIMUMWAGE ANDOVERTIME PROTECTIONS FORHOMECAREWORKERS 2 (2015),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/NELP-Fact-Sheet-Companionship-Rules-Reform.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DS8D-35AR].
54 We Count on Home Care: U.S. Court of Appeals Unanimously Upheld DOL
Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE AND HOUR DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/
litigation.htm [http://perma.cc/8VDS-F7M8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
55 Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also
Noam Scheiber, U.S. Court Reinstates Home Care Pay Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/business/us-court-reinstates-home-care-pay-
rules.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/SE67-5RNE].
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II. AN EPIDEMIC OFWAGE THEFT
Wage theft is a term used to describe a broad spectrum of
employer violations of federal and state laws that result in
workers not being paid their legally mandated wages for hours
worked.56 “Wage theft is not incidental, aberrant, or rare,” but
rather, it is rampant, persistent, and pernicious and is committed
by a wide range of employers within the home care industry.57
“[T]hese unlawful practices result in millions of dollars of lost
wages for workers who can least afford it.”58 A study of workers in
low-wage industries across three U.S. cities found that in any
given week, two-thirds had been the victim of at least one
incidence of wage theft.59 The researchers estimated that the
average loss per worker over the course of a year was $2,634 out
of total earnings of $17,616, a collective loss for workers in those
three cities alone of $3 billion.60 According to the Economic Policy
56 KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING
AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2009); see also
Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That Bar
Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1106-07 (2012).
Low-wage workers, for whom the problem of wage theft is particularly acute, account
for almost one-quarter of all U.S. adults. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2014 (2014), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2014_empl_outlook-2014-en#
page289 [http://perma.cc/A8M9-LRGW]. These workers earn an “average of $27,000 a
year while working at least thirty hours per week.” Ruan, supra, at 1107-08 (citing THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., LOW-WAGE WORKERS AND HEALTH CARE 1 (2008),
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7804.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7Z3-D63L]).
57 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE
TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT 6 (2011), www.nelp.org/page/-
/Justice/2011/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/8P9Y-HB5H]. A 2008 (i.e.,
prerecession) survey of 4,387 low-wage workers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York
underscored the barriers faced by low-wage workers when they seek redress for wage
theft. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS
OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (2009), http://nelp.3cdn.net/
b294e0aad2ba7008e3_2pm6br7gi.pdf [http://perma.cc/9R8K-26EM]. These “front-line”
workers were employed by both large and small employers in a variety of industries, such
as retail stores, residential construction, and home health care. Id. at 2, 31. The survey
asked specific questions about their work and compensation in the previous work week.
Id. Of the workers surveyed, 26% reported being paid less than minimum wage, with
more than half underpaid by more than one dollar an hour. Id. at 2. For the low-wage
workers that worked over 40 hours in a week, 76% faced unpaid or underpaid overtime.
Id. These (and other) violations resulted in a wage theft of 15% of earnings for the
surveyed workers, and if extrapolated to the nearly 1.12 million low-wage workers in the
three cities, would result in low-wage workers losing more than $56 million per week. Id.
at 6. Home care employers illegally denied overtime pay to nearly 83% of home care
workers who had earned it and failed to properly compensate 90% of those who worked
before or after their official shift. Id. at 35.
58 Ruan, supra note 56, at 1107. See generally BERNHARDT ET AL., supra
note 57, at 5.
59 BERNHARDT, ET AL., supra note 57, at 5.
60 Meixell & Eisenbrey, supra note 12, at 1.
530 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
Institute, “[i]f these findings in New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles are generalizable to the rest of the U.S. low-wage
workforce, wage theft is costing more than $50 billion a year.”61
Wage theft is particularly prevalent in the home care
industry, which has created a workplace culture of noncompliance,
illustrated by the cavalier reaction of one home care agency CEO
to an overtime class action filed by her employees: “We just
haven’t paid overtime . . . . It’s no mystery in this industry.”62
Home care is conducted within private homes, outside of public
view and governmental inspection. Home care workers become
victims of wage theft when their employers require “off-the-
clock”63 work or misclassify the workers as “independent
contractors”64 to evade payroll taxes.65 Workers who are
misclassified risk losing not only the protection of minimum wage
and overtime laws, but also safety-net benefits like
unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and Social
Security and Medicare.
Persistent and unchecked wage theft in the home care
industry is exacerbated by employers’ incentives to violate
61 Id.
62 Daniel Massey, Home Care Service Sued Over Pay Practices, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS. (Apr. 14, 2010, 12:43 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20100414/FREE/
100419938/home-care-service-sued-over-pay-practices [http://perma.cc/8KFL-5KBH].
63 ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., EMPLOYERS GONE ROGUE, EXPLAINING
INDUSTRY VARIATION IN VIOLATIONS OF WORKPLACE LAWS, (2013) (“Off-the-clock
violations are above average for home health care . . . .”); see also Cole Stangler, Home
Care Workers’ Lawsuit Alleging Wage Theft Exposes Growing Industry’s Troubling Pay
Practices, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (June 16, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/home-care-
workers-lawsuit-alleging-wage-theft-exposes-growing-industrys-troubling-pay-1969087
[http://perma.cc/UTT6-WVKG] (“[C]aring for seniors tends to forge emotional ties
between workers and clients. While rewarding, the bonds can drive employees to put in
extra time, whether or not they’re properly compensated for it. ‘Bad
employers’ . . . exploit that sense of obligation to extract unpaid labor.”).
64 See, e.g., Lee’s Industries, Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268-69 (2010). After
workers filed a lawsuit seeking unpaid overtime wages, the defendant home care agency
told them that they had to sign an agreement calling them “independent contractors” if
they wanted to keep their jobs. Id.; see also Cooney v. O’Connor, No. 1788 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Nov. 26, 2002) (Maryland home care agency required its employees to sign an
“Independent Contractor Application” as a condition of getting a job placement and
unsuccessfully attempted to prevent former employees from collecting unemployment
insurance benefits); Klausner v. Brockman, 58 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(two home care aides later found to be employees were directed to register a shell home
care business, required to sign contracts deeming them to be independent contractors,
and issued IRS 1099 Forms for Independent Contractors).
65 See Payroll Fraud: Targeting Bad Actors Hurting Workers and Businesses:
Hearing Before the United States Congress Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor
& Pensions, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus)
(“Companies . . . [misclassify employees] to avoid having to report and pay FICA and
FUTA taxes, evade labor organizing, skirt baseline labor standards like minimum
wage and overtime, discrimination protections, health and safety and workers
compensation, and unemployment insurance.”).
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workplace standards and employees’ disincentives to pursue
claims. In a recent study of the efficacy of workplace standards
enforcement regimes, Professors Alexander and Prasad found
that “the least politically, economically, and socially powerful and
secure workers were the least likely to make claims, the most
likely to experience retaliation, and the least likely to have
accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge.”66 These
workers included women, those who lacked legal immigration
status, and those with low education levels—demographics that
mirror those of the home care industry.67
Unchecked wage theft negatively impacts ethical
employers who may want to comply with legal standards but find
it impossible to compete with law-breaking agencies in a slow
economy. The incentives for employers to violate the law are
clear. By engaging in wage theft, employers can illegally—and
significantly—reduce their payroll costs and underbid
competitors; this hurts law-abiding businesses and encourages
unfair competition. These practices illegally siphon off state, local,
and federal tax dollars, translating into millions of dollars in lost
revenues for local governments.68
In a double blow to state and local economies, since low-
income workers are likely to circulate their earnings in the local
economy by spending on basic necessities like food, clothing, and
66 Charlotte Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1089, 1098-99 (2014); see also HOME
ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at xii (“Among workers who are fired from a domestic work
job, 23 percent are fired for complaining about working conditions, and 18 percent are
fired for protesting violations of their contract or agreement. . . . 91 percent of workers
who encountered problems with their working conditions in the prior 12 months did
not complain because they were afraid they would lose their job. 85 percent of
undocumented immigrants who encountered problems with their working conditions in
the prior 12 months did not complain because they feared their immigration status
would be used against them.”).
67 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 66, at 1098-99.
68 SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE
TREASURIES 1 (2012), http://nelp.3cdn.net/0693974b8e20a9213e_g8m6bhyfx.pdf [http://
perma.cc/EUF5-RXV3] (detailing numerous state and federal studies and estimates of
costs); see also EASTERN RESEARCH GRP., INC., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
WAGE VIOLATIONS: ESTIMATES FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK (2014), http://www.dol.gov/
asp/evaluation/completed-studies/WageViolationsReportDecember2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9Y88-XQ9D] (The report “estimates that minimum wage violations in California reduced
payroll taxes by $167 million in 2010 . . . . In New York, the estimated reduction in payroll
tax was $71.0 million in 2010 . . . . Minimum wage violations resulted in an estimated $113
million in lost federal income taxes in 2010 (between the two states). The California state
government lost $14 million and the New York state government lost $8 million in income
tax revenues in tax year 2010 due to minimum wage violations. Finally, minimum wage
violations led to workers who had violations losing $4.5 million in EITC benefits in
California and $1.1 million in EITC benefits in New York in 2010.”).
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housing,69 any theft of those earnings by employers affects not
only the low-wage home care worker, but also the other
businesses that workers would have patronized in the absence of
wage theft.70 Moreover, when home care workers’ wages are
stolen by their employers, the workers and their families are often
forced to rely on already strained public safety nets, such as food
stamps, food banks, temporary assistance with utility bill
payments, subsidized housing, and shelters.
III. EXISTING APPROACHES TO COMBATINGWAGE THEFT
Deterring wage theft relies on effective and aggressive
enforcement of the FLSA and complementary state laws and
local ordinances, which in turn require resources and political
support. As described below, recent shifts in enforcement
priorities at the DOL and parallel state agencies have the
potential to improve standards in the home care industry.
Targeted industry strategies, together with innovative
partnership and collective strategies, may be more effective
than the traditional means of enforcing the FLSA, but they still
face significant challenges.
A. Limited FLSA Enforcement
Home care workers who have experienced wage theft
have three options for redress under existing workplace laws:
file a complaint with the appropriate state or federal labor
agency, file a private lawsuit under the FLSA or state wage and
hour laws, or pursue both avenues.71 Given the political nature
of resource allocation for the public enforcement of wage and
hour laws, these decisions are highly individual, personal, and
69 BURNHAM & THEODORE, supra note 16, at xi. Many indicate that their most
basic needs go unmet. Id. (“60 percent spend more than half of their income on rent or
mortgage payments. 37 percent of workers paid their rent or mortgage late during the year
prior to being interviewed. 40 percent paid some of their other essential bills late during the
same time period. 20 percent report that there were times in the previous month when
there was no food to eat in their homes because there was no money to buy any.”).
70 HOUS. INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE CTR., HOUSTON, WE HAVE A WAGE
THEFT PROBLEM (2012), https://stopwagetheft.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/2012-houston-
wage-theft-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Y6A-L2VL].
71 See Backpay, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/
backpay.htm [http://perma.cc/5JX2-G5MW] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); How to File a
Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/wecanhelp/howtofilecomplaint.htm
[http://perma.cc/9Q32-E7AG] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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economically and emotionally costly.72 Critics of the existing
regulatory landscape have argued that when workers engage in
a “cost-benefit analysis” of pursuing legal claims for wage theft
by employers, the costs of an external, formal claim are often too
great for low-wage workers, especially when compared with the
modest (at best) benefits.73
Moreover, when home care workers pursue individual
claims, the risk of retaliation by employers increases. Retaliation
can take many forms, including termination, salary reduction,
harassment, and adverse changes to schedules or assignments.74
In a recent study of low-wage workers who pursued a claim
against an employer for wage theft, about 43% experienced some
form of retaliation.75 Such retaliation is itself often without a
helpful legal solution, given that the only remedy offered by
traditional employment and labor law is an opportunity to pursue
in court a claim for the retaliation—the very action that placed
the worker in jeopardy in the first place. This is particularly
evident when it comes to class action lawsuits, in which even the
collective status of the plaintiffs does little to cover the individual
risk. Having to “opt in” to a wage theft class action (as contrasted,
for example, with an “opt out” consumer rights lawsuit) “requires
[low-wage] workers to take the very public step of joining a
lawsuit, rather than being part of an anonymous class
represented by a few named plaintiffs.”76 As Natinya Ruan has
observed, the existing framework for enforcing workplace labor
standards creates a “self-perpetuating enforcement gap in low-
wage workplaces”77 in which, “[w]orkers are overdeterred from
claiming, while employers are underdeterred from complying.”78
72 Ruan, supra note 56, at 1111-12. Under the Obama administration, funding
for workplace public enforcement improved, though “[w]hether these measures can
reverse a three-decade long decline in DOL enforcement remains to be seen.” Id. at 1114.
73 See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 66, at 1103-04. Moreover, as the
authors note, “incompetence and processing delays may render government agencies an
unattractive forum for workers seeking effective and timely redress for workplace
problems.” Id. at 1105; see, e.g., U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-458T,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT
(2009) (“[The Government Accountability Office’s] overall assessment of the [Wage and
Hour Division’s] complaint intake, conciliation, and investigation processes found an
ineffective system that discourages wage theft complaints.”).
74 See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(D) (1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html#
IIpartD [http://perma.cc/F4FW-QF2B].
75 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 66, at 1104.
76 Id. at 1113.
77 Id. at 1107.
78 Id. at 1108.
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Moreover, the endemic inequality in bargaining power between
home care workers and employers undercuts one-on-one
negotiations.79 As Ai-jen Poo, a domestic-worker organizer,
explained, “When individual workers try to bargain with their
employers, termination is the standard result since employers can
simply hire another worker.”80
B. Recent Federal Leadership
Following decades of critical underfunding,81 short staffing,
and claims backlog, the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has
entered a new era of vigorous and strategic enforcement.82 Since
2009, the WHD has hired 300 new investigators to target
industries and employers most likely to violate workplace
standards, resulting in a recovery of over $1.3 billion in unpaid
and owed wages.83 David Weil, the newly confirmed head of the
[T]he failure of operational rights to create appropriate incentives in either the
context of private lawsuits or government complaints means that the risk
associated with enforcement is shifted to the parties who can least bear it. . . . As
a result, the would-be law enforcers for whom costs are particularly heavy, the
low-wage, front-line workers studied here, may choose simply to stay silent or to
exit and drop out of the workplace dispute pyramid altogether.
Id. at 1106.
79 AI-JEN POO, DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED, ORGANIZING WITH LOVE: LESSONS
FROM THE NEW YORK DOMESTIC WORKERS BILL OF RIGHTS CAMPAIGN 4 (2010),
http://www.cew.umich.edu/sites/default/files/Organizingwithlove--FullReport-Cover_0.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8ACY-22NZ] (“With no clear standards or laws to ensure basic rights,
workers have to negotiate the terms of their employment individually day-by-day in
situations where they lack any real bargaining power.”).
80 Id. at 8.
81 “Between 1975 and 2004, the number of workplace investigators declined
by 14% and the number of compliance actions completed declined by 36%—while the
number of covered workers grew by 55%, and the number of covered establishments
grew by 112%.” ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS
IN NEW YORK CITY 31 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/unregulated-
work-global-city-full-report-chapter-downloads [http://perma.cc/F2BB-QUME].
82 Working for a Fair Day’s Pay, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/
whd/statistics/ [http://perma.cc/XK48-5D5G] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
83 Testimony of Nancy J. Leppink, Deputy Wage and Hour Administrator,
Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. before the Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections, Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives,
Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/congress/20111103_leppink.htm [http://perma.cc
/9JV5-AGUS]; Testimony of Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., before the
Subcommittee On Labor, Health & Human Services, Committee On Appropriations, U.S.
Senate, Apr. 9, 2014, http://www.dol.gov/newsroom/congress/20140409_Perez [http://perma.cc
/ER5W-BJVX]. The WHD collected approximately $240 million in back wages from
employers this past fiscal year.Working for a Fair Day’s Pay, supra note 82.
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WHD,84 had, as an academic and advisor to the DOL,
recommended that the division focus its resources on particular
“fissured” industries in which businesses employ high numbers of
subcontractors and other contingent workers and disclaim any
legal responsibility for wages and working conditions.85 Now, as
the agency’s head, Weil has pursued that very strategy.86 Under
Weil’s leadership, efforts to crack down on employee
misclassification have yielded significant gains for workers in
industries that frequently turn to subcontracting as a way to cut
costs and avoid responsibility for labor standards.87 The DOL has
also begun to more aggressively partner with state governments
and industry partners to strengthen enforcement efforts.88
Taking a more data-driven approach, the DOL
commissioned a study to estimate the impact of state and federal
minimum wage and overtime pay violations.89 Based on the results
of the study, which found pervasive minimum wage violations and
a multitude of negative impacts on workers who become victims of
such theft, the authors suggested that the findings be used as a
targeting tool.90 But despite its recent increases in staffing and a
84 Dr. David Weil—Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/about/org/dweil.htm [http://perma.cc/N7E3-QGXS] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2016) (Weil sworn in on May 5, 2014).
85 See DAVIDWEIL, IMPROVINGWORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THEWAGE ANDHOUR DIVISION (2010), http://www.dol.gov/
whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf [http://perma.cc/XC4T-2DCQ]; see also DAVID
WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014) (providing a detailed analysis of the impacts
of industry subcontracting and reorganization on wages, working conditions, and
income inequality).
86 Lauren Weber, Wage-Law Enforcer Favors Proactive Approach, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boss-talk-wage-law-enforcer-favors-
proactive-approach-1419972132 [http://perma.cc/J85Z-77NG].
87 Id.; see also Steven Greenhouse, Study Finds Violations of Wage Law in New
York and California, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/busines
s/study-finds-violations-of-wage-law-in-new-york-and-california.html [http://perma.cc/59CW-
FLAJ] (“The number of investigators in the Wage and Hour Division has increased to 1,040
from 731 in 2008, the Labor Department said. Since 2009 the department has recovered $1
billion in back wages for workers who suffered minimum wage and other violations.”). Amy
B. Dean, Meet Washington’s Wage and Hour Enforcer, AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 19, 2015, 2:00
AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/10/meet-washingtons-wage-and-hour-
enforcer.html [http://perma.cc/R63U-KJNC].
88 See Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards
Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552
(2011). The DOL has entered into memoranda of understanding with state agencies in
Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See Misclassification of Employees as Independent
Contractors, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/#
newsroom [http://perma.cc/YS2G-XXC3] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
89 EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 68, at ES-1, ES-4.
90 Id. at 61-64.
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reduction in the backlog of claims, the DOL is still not adequately
resourced to fully enforce the FLSA alone. Enforcing this critical
piece of federal workplace protection requires partnership with
state and local governments.91 While operating with smaller
budgets and varying degrees of political will, local and state
agencies have the potential to craft enforcement approaches that
are nimble, creative, and collaborative.
C. State and Local Innovation
State agencies have also provided more effective
leadership in enforcing federal and state wage and hour laws, as
well as in bridging some of the gaps in federal workplace protection
in the home care industry.92 States like New York, California,
Connecticut, and Maryland, among others, have passed legislation
designed to deter wage theft by requiring that employers notify
employees of the particular amount and method of wage payment
and subjecting employers who violate wage and hour standards to
enhanced fines and criminal penalties.93 Using more aggressive
and effective enforcement techniques, the California Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement has begun conducting more
focused investigations of employers within targeted industries
uring nonbusiness hours.94 Likewise, in New York, the Attorney
General has prioritized investigation and enforcement against
employers who have repeatedly violated wage and hour laws,
specifically targeting employers in certain industries.95
91 See Fine & Gordon, supra note 88.
92 Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State
Attorneys General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 495, 508-19 (2006) (detailing the enforcement regimes of California, Maine,
Massachusetts, and New York).
93 For a summary of state wage-theft laws, see SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT.,
PAYMENT OF WAGES/DIRECT DEPOSIT LAWS (2014), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/
stateandlocalresources/stateandlocalstatutesandregulations/documents/wagepayment
law.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9YX-L2ZE].
94 JULIE A. SU, LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV. AGENCY, A REPORT ON THE STATE
OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT 1 (2013), http://www.dir.ca.gov/
dlse/Publications/DLSE_Report2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF5X-KGAQ] (“In 2012, BOFE’s
more targeted, efficient use of inspections yielded the highest rate of civil penalty
citations (80%) in the past 10 years.”).
95 Fine & Gordon, supra note 88, at 568-70. In 2009, the New York State
Department of Labor launched a “Wage and Hour Watch” program, in which the DOL
formally partnered with six community-based organizations (Make the Road New
York, the Workplace Project, Centro del Derecho, Chinese Staff and Workers
Association, RWDSU, and UFCW Local #1500) using a “neighborhood watch” model of
workplace enforcement. Id. at 584 n.110; see also Friedman, supra note 92, at 528
(“When the [New York Labor] Bureau receives a complaint from a worker about a
specific employer, it investigates every possible violation by that employer, and
prioritizes complaints in which similar employers are committing violations.”).
2016] WAGE THEFT AS PUBLIC LARCENY 537
States have also been incubators for home care industry
regulations. For example, some states extended state minimum
wage protections to their home care workers even in advance of
the federal government’s proposed rules.96 New York passed a
Domestic Worker Bill of Rights in 2010, which, among other
things, expanded minimum wage coverage to companions solely
employed by households (as opposed to agencies) and mandated a
higher rate of overtime pay for live-in domestic workers and live-
out companions.97 New York also passed a Home Care Worker
Wage Parity Law, which established minimum “total
compensation” requirements for home care workers who perform
96 See PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., WHICH STATES PROVIDE
MINIMUM WAGE AND OVERTIME TO HOME CARE WORKERS? (2011),
http://nelp.3cdn.net/6e193991edf8bd0df9_o6m6i28s2.pdf [http://perma.cc/TH73-PE5Q];
see also PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., STATE-BY-STATE PROJECTED DEMAND
FOR NEW DIRECT-CARE WORKERS, 2006-16 (2009), http://phinational.org/sites/
phinational.org/files/clearinghouse/State%20by%20State%20DCW%20Demand%20Projec
tions%202006-16%20FINAL%20rev.pdf [http://perma.cc/UH8K-DJ5H]; PAUL K. SONN ET
AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, FAIR PAY FOR HOME CARE WORKERS: REFORMING THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S COMPANIONSHIP REGULATIONS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT app. (2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/FairPayfor
HomeCareWorkers.pdf [http://perma.cc/K73F-P8KV] (stating that the amount and extent
of coverage varies). Maine, for example, provides minimum wage and overtime coverage
for all home care workers, without relevant exemptions. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§§ 663, 664 (2013). Maryland extended minimum wage to all home care workers and
overtime coverage to most, but it retained an exemption for workers employed by
nonprofit agencies. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-415 (West 2014). Other states, like
Ohio, provide a minimum wage but no overtime coverage for home care workers because
the law adopts the FLSA exemptions. OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 4111.03(A) (West 2007).
97 Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, 2010 N.Y. Sess. Laws 481 (McKinney)
(codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (LexisNexis 2016) (definitions); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296-b (LexisNexis 2015) (prohibiting discrimination against domestic workers); N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 2 (LexisNexis 2015) (definitions); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 160 (LexisNexis 2015)
(hours of labor for a day’s work); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 161 (LexisNexis 2015) (one day of
rest in seven, three days paid leave a year); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 170 (LexisNexis 2015)
(hours of work for domestic workers); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 651 (LexisNexis 2015)
(definitions); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 691 (LexisNexis 2015) (statement of employee rights and
employer obligations); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 692 (LexisNexis 2015) (recordkeeping
requirements); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. § 201 (LexisNexis 2015) (definitions)). The law
mandated time off from work (one day off in any seven day period; after one year of
employment, three paid days of rest), established prohibitions against sexual
harassment and other forms of workplace discrimination, and provided temporary
disability benefits for part-time and full-time domestic workers. According to the law, a
person is considered a domestic worker if he or she works in another person’s home to
care for a child, serves as a companion for a sick, convalescing, or elderly person, does
housekeeping, or performs any other domestic service tasks. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 2(16)
(LexisNexis 2013); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-b (LexisNexis 2015). A person performing
companionship services without additional domestic work such as cleaning services,
however, is not subject to the overtime and day of rest rules. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LAB.,
FACTS FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS, https://labor.ny.gov/legal/laws/pdf/domestic-workers/
facts-for-domestic-workers.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NFQ-3H64]; see also N.Y. STATE DIV. OF
HUMANRIGHTS, PROTECTION OFDOMESTICWORKERS FROMHARASSMENT UNDER THENYS
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, http://www.labor.ny.gov/sites/legal/laws/pdf_word_docs/domestic-
workers/human-rights-trifold-domestic-workers.pdf [http://perma.cc/F5LH-SEJT].
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Medicaid-reimbursed work for certified home health agencies,
long-term home health care programs, and managed care plans.98
While certain states, including New York and California,
have demonstrated legislative leadership and commitment to
creative and collaborative enforcement strategies, state-by-state
efforts alone are insufficient to raise standards in this national
industry. As noted by Professors Fine and Gordon, since many of
these state and local initiatives have emerged on an ad hoc basis,
rather than through institutional policy, they may be difficult to
sustain in the face of budget cuts or political regime change.99
Enforcement strategies driven by workers, rather than regulators,
may help overcome these persistent barriers to achieving greater
stability and sustainability within this growing industry.
D. Collective Strategies
As an alternative to legislative and administrative
strategies, home care workers have organized unions,
cooperatives, and collectives as a means of generating stable
employment and living wages, building collective political power,
and enforcing workplace standards.100 The success of these recent
campaigns101 dispels the myth that isolation and intimidation in
the home care industry are insurmountable organizing
obstacles.102 Worker organizations like Domestic Workers United
98 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3614-C (LexisNexis 2015). The original proposal,
which was ultimately not endorsed by the full committee, was “‘intended to address the
inconsistency in wages among home care workers’ and thereby improve the recruitment
and retention of high-quality home care aides.” Concerned Home Care Providers, Inc. v.
Cuomo, 783 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting N.Y. STATE DEP’T OFHEALTH, PROPOSALS
BEING RATED 71 (2011), http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/
proposals_being_rated.pdf [http://perma.cc/EFT2-YTSP]).
99 Fine & Gordon, supra note 88, at 561.
100 Elizabeth J. Kennedy, When the Shop Floor is in the Living Room: Toward
a Domestic Employment Relationship Theory, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 643, 645,
683, 685 (2012). See generally Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at
the Edge of the Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417 (2005) (documenting the efforts of
various worker centers).
101 See generally Hina Shah & Marci Seville, Domestic Worker Organizing:
Building A Contemporary Movement for Dignity and Power, 75 ALB. L. REV. 413, 413-
14, 430-35 (2012) (detailing successful state, national, and international campaigns for
domestic worker justice, including the New York State Domestic Worker Bill of Rights,
the establishment of Domestic Workers United and the National Domestic Worker
Alliance, the International Labour Organization’s adoption of the ILO Convention and
Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, and multiple
campaigns in California by a broad coalition of domestic worker advocacy
organizations, worker collectives, and labor unions).
102 Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State
Labor Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1391 (2008). For a detailed history of the historical
exclusion of domestic workers from mainstream labor unions, see, for example,
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and campaigns like Caring Across Generations have developed
transformative organizing models aimed at improving workers’
lives as employees, parents, caregivers, and community
members.103 Rooted in communities of low-wage, immigrant
workers, home care cooperatives like Cooperative Home Care
Associates, Inc.104 have helped to enforce evolving industry
standards through formal and informal mediation and litigation
and by providing domestic workers with leadership training and
organizing opportunities.105
As Fine and Gordon note, the original architects of the
FLSA envisioned an enforcement system in which worker-based
organizations would directly participate in enforcing wage and
hour laws.106 They advocate for augmenting existing government
enforcement by giving unions and worker organizations a formal
role in enforcing compliance with minimum wage and overtime
laws in low-wage industries.107 The strategies proposed in the
next part also rest on the principle that those “closest to the
action” be empowered to work with government in order to detect,
report, and prevent wage theft. While not intended to replace the
traditional means of enforcing the FLSA described above, the
complementary legal theories explored in Part IV may leverage
DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS INMODERN AMERICA (2004).
103 PAMWHITEFIELD ET AL., IS THERE AWOMEN’SWAY OFORGANIZING? GENDER,
UNIONS AND EFFECTIVE ORGANIZING 2, 12, 18, 21 (2009), http://digitalcommons.
ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=reports [http://perma.cc/DNN7-
4CKN] (“As immigrants, mothers, and women of color, they also wanted to address
immigrant rights, healthcare reform, and other issues affecting workers outside the
workplace. . . . [A]ddressing these ‘whole life’ issues inspired personal involvement and
investment in the union.”); JENNIFER ITO ET AL., TRANSFORMING LIVES, TRANSFORMING
MOVEMENT BUILDING: LESSONS FROM THENATIONAL DOMESTICWORKERS ALLIANCE 9-10
(2014), http://www.soltransforminglives.org/pdf/sol-transforming-lives-executive-summary-
4.pdf [http://perma.cc/VWU8-5E8U]. The formation of the “Excluded Worker Congress” at
the 2010 U.S. Social Forum reflects a growing movement to organize all “excluded
workers” (those who by law or policy are denied the right to organize and other
fundamental labor rights), including (but not limited to) farm workers, guest workers,
day laborers, domestic workers, and workers in right to work states. See Background,
UNITED WORKERS CONGRESS, http://www.unitedworkerscongress.org/background--
vision.html [http://perma.cc/CBQ7-SSPS] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
104 COOPERATIVEHOMECAREASSOCIATES, http://www.chcany.org [http://perma.cc/
NP3W-35BR] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
105 See generally Fine, Edge of the Dream, supra note 100 (documenting the
efforts of various worker centers). See also Laura Flanders, How America’s Largest
Worker Owned Co-op Lifts People Out of Poverty, YES! MAG. (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/the-end-of-poverty/how-america-s-largest-worker-owned
-co-op-lifts-people-out-of-poverty [http://perma.cc/R9MF-H3UA] (“To raise industry
standards, not just for CHCA workers but across the field, CHCA started the worker-
run Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (PHI) that trains agencies across the
country while also fighting for policy shifts.”).
106 Fine & Gordon, supra note 88, at 575-76.
107 Id. at 561 (such collaborationsmust be “formalized,” “sustained,” and “vigorous”).
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the unique nature of home care to include consumers and their
families as potential partners in enforcing standards.
IV. PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT ALTERNATIVES
In addition to the “proactive” regime of DOL-WHD
investigations, enforcing workplace standards in the United
States also relies heavily on a system of “operational rights”—
incentives for workers to bring individual and collective claims
from the “bottom up.”108 Most laws—federal, state, and local—that
establish workplace standards provide employees with the right
to bring a private lawsuit against an employer that violates those
standards.109 The number of private lawsuits filed by employees
seeking redress eclipses the number of enforcement actions
initiated by the government.110 In the context of home care
workers, however, this system of operational rights, to be
effective, must include targeted mechanisms for creative and
collective enforcement.
Advocates for new models of workplace rights
enforcement, particularly in low-wage industries, have
recommended that the bottom-up structure be preserved but
strengthened by a system that rebalances the costs and benefits
in ways that benefit both employers111 and employees.112 For
ethical, law-abiding employers who also operate on low profit
margins, a system that more effectively enforces wage standards
could allow them to compete on a more level playing field, rather
than being forced to compete with unscrupulous employers whose
law breaking gives them an economic advantage.
The following sections propose three alternatives to
enforcing compliance with wage standards in the home care
industry. The first proposed strategy is to apply the qui tam
provision of the federal False Claims Act (FCA) to cases where
108 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 66, at 1069-73.
109 Id. at 1070.
110 Id.
111 Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Michael B. Runnels, Bringing New Governance
Home: The Need for Regulation in the Domestic Workplace, 81 UMKC L. REV. 899, 940-
41 (2013) (summarizing the system of “co-regulation” as put forth by Professor Cynthia
Estlund, which “supports the initiatives of ‘high road’ domestic employers—and equips
domestic workers and their employers with the tools necessary to develop enforceable
workplace agreements based on core industry standards and mutual interests”).
112 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 66, at 1108. One suggestion is for the U.S.
Department of Labor to “establish an optional, one-way binding arbitration system,
modeled on a program in place at The Coca-Cola Company, [which] would give workers
a forum for speedy claim resolution.” Id. at 1114. Under the Coca-Cola system, only the
employer would be bound by the arbitrator’s decision. The workers would still be free to
pursue their claims externally. Id at 1115.
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home care employers receive federal tax dollars through the
Medicaid and Medicare programs but fail to pay wages in
accordance with applicable law. Given the particular funding
structure of these governmental programs, as well as recent qui
tam decisions, a second strategy is articulated using a fiduciary
duty framework. The third proposed strategy is to leverage the
authority of the Department of Health and Human Services
Office of Inspector General to exclude home care employers from
participation in federal health care programs (e.g., Medicare and
Medicaid) upon a conviction or administrative determination of
wage theft.
A. False Claims Act Litigation
1. Traditional Application
Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 in response to
concerns of rampant fraud by suppliers of goods to the Union
Army during the Civil War.113 Given the federal government’s
limited enforcement resources at the time, the key to the success
of the FCA was its qui tam provision, which allowed private
citizens, or “relators,” to act as whistleblowers or “private
attorneys general” by suing on behalf of the federal government
and collecting a share of its recovery.114 The FCA provided that
any person who knowingly submitted false claims to the
government was liable for double the government’s damages,
plus a penalty of $2,000 for each false claim; relators were
originally entitled to 50% of the amount recovered.115
In its current form, the FCA creates liability for any
person who knowingly submits a false claim to the government,
uses a false statement to induce the government to pay a false
claim, conspires to defraud the government into paying a false
claim, or uses a false statement to reduce an obligation to pay the
government.116 Over time, the FCA has been amended to raise the
113 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (describing the “sordid
picture” painted for the Congress at the time the bill passed, when “the United States
had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods
delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war”). Through
passage of the Act, “Congress wanted to stop this plundering of the public treasury.” Id.
114 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b) (2012) (outlining authority of DOJ and private
persons to bring suit).
115 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5-6 (Aug. 6, 2009),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8RN-U8DF] (tracing the
history of the contemporary FCAwith reference to the Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696).
116 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)-(b).
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penalties for false claims from double to treble damages117—from
$2,000 to a range of $5,000 to $10,000.118 Relators, if successful,
may collect up to 30% of the government’s recovered damages.119
In addition to encouraging individual whistleblowers to
report fraud, the qui tam provision incentivizes lawyers and third
parties to actively investigate and look for claims. For those
looking, the home care industry, much like the larger health care
industry in which it participates, is likely rife with potential
claims.120 The most common types of claims initiated under the
qui tam provision “assert fraud in connection with federally
funded healthcare services under Medicare, Medicaid, and
defense-procurement contracts.”121 According to a recent report by
the Government Accountability Office, approximately $63 billion
worth of “improper payments” were made in fiscal year 2014
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.122
Given the significant lack of procedural legal knowledge
on the part of low-wage workers, incentives for lawyers and third
parties to look for qui tam claims are particularly important in
117 Compare 31 U.S.C. 3729(a) (1982), with 31 U.S.C. 3729(a) (1986). The prior
statutory penalty of $2,000 had been set in 1863. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 (“The False Claims Act currently permits the
United States to recover double damages plus $2,000 for each false or fraudulent claim.”).
118 Compare 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2) (1982), with 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2) (1986).
119 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)-(d) (2012).
120 See, e.g., Examples of Health Care Fraud—Fiscal Year 2014, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Healthcare-Fraud-Investigations-
Fiscal-Year-2014 [http://perma.cc/75SK-YXAF] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (listing
examples, including the owners of a home health care company sentenced to 120
months in prison in connection with a $20 million health care fraud scheme).
121 David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from
Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1944 (2014).
122 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-482T, IMPROPER PAYMENTS:
GOVERNMENT-WIDE ESTIMATES AND USE OF DEATH DATA TO HELP PREVENT PAYMENTS TO
DECEASED INDIVIDUALS 3 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669026.pdf [http://perma.cc/
7ART-97UY] (estimating improper payments under Medicare fee-for-service at
$45,754,000,000 and under Medicaid at $17,492,000,000). The government has previously
estimated losses around $48 billion, an amount that former Attorney General Eric Holder
suggested was lower than the actual figure of between $60 and $90 billion. Merrill
Matthews,Medicare and Medicaid Fraud is Costing Taxpayers Billions, FORBES (May 31,
2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2012/05/31/medicare-and-
medicaid-fraud-is-costing-taxpayers-billions/ [http://perma.cc/KMG5-V3BW]. For fiscal
year 2014, the government reported that it had recovered $2.3 billion through FCA claims
against the health care industry. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs,
Justice Dep’t Recovers Nearly $6 Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov.
20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false
-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 [http://perma.cc/FV46-9HGU] (marking “five straight
years the department has recovered more than $2 billion in cases involving false claims
against federal health care programs such as Medicare, Medicaid and TRICARE, the
health care program for the military”).
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the home care industry.123 To wit, a recent study found that
“women, workers without legal immigration status, workers
employed by low-road employers, and those who identified as
‘Asian or other race’ were all less likely . . . to know where to file a
workplace complaint with a government agency.”124 As discussed
in Part I, most home care workers fit this demographic profile.
Using the FCA to enforce minimum wage and hour
standards is not a new idea. Qui tam claims have been used to
enforce prevailing wage requirements in government
construction contracts at both the federal (Davis-Bacon Act125
123 Other recent approaches to incentivizing third parties and lawyers to
ferret out fraud in health care spending include several of the 2010 amendments
passed as part of the Affordable Care Act, which make it easier for whistleblowers to
sue on the government’s behalf by limiting “Public Disclosures” and expanding the
definition of “Original Source.” Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 901-902 (2010); see
MICHAEL TABB, THE IMPACT OF 2010 HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT
LITIGATION (2011), http://www.greenellp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Michael-Tabb-
PPACA-Amendments.pdf [http://perma.cc/D9S5-FQ46]. Others have previously recognized
the potential for incentivizing lawyers and third parties to use the FCA as a tool for
patient protection. See, e.g., John M. Parisi, A Weapon Against Nursing Home Fraud
and Abuse, TRIAL, Dec. 1999, at 48 (noting that while most attorneys engaged in
negligent care or other tort-based litigation related to patient abuse are unfamiliar
with the FCA, its use can “ensure that nursing home residents who receive federal
benefits also get the care they need”).
124 Alexander & Prasad, supra note 66, at 1096.
Approximately 23% of workers had accurate procedural legal knowledge; a
corresponding 77% did not know where to file a workplace complaint with the
government. Interestingly, even those workers who knew how to make a
government complaint were unlikely to act on that knowledge, as 96% of
workers who did make a claim on the job made it directly to their employers,
rather than to a government agency or other third party. Moreover, the 23%
result may actually be inflated, as a worker’s knowledge of government
complaint procedures was self-reported, with no way for researchers to test
the accuracy of workers’ responses.
Id. at 1095. Moreover, as this and other academic studies recognize, undocumented
workers are less likely to make a complaint to the government for fear of detection and
deportation. Id. at 1096; see also Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1101-03 (2011) (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ mistrust of
even friendly or status-neutral U.S. government institutions).
125 The Davis-Bacon Act’s prevailing wage provisions apply to the Related
Acts, under which federal agencies assist construction projects through “grants, loans,
loan guarantees, and insurance.” See 29 C.F.R. § 5.2(c) (2016); 40 U.S.C. § 3141 (2012).
Contractors and subcontractors performing on federally funded or assisted contracts in
excess of $2,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair (including painting and
decorating) of public buildings or public works must pay their laborers and mechanics
employed under the contract no less than the locally prevailing wages and fringe
benefits for corresponding work on similar projects in the area. 40 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(b)
(2012). The Davis-Bacon Act directs the Department of Labor to determine such locally
prevailing wage rates. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union
No. 38 v. C.W. Roen Const. Co., 183 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing qui tam
action brought by union alleging that construction company failed to pay prevailing
wages under Davis-Bacon Act).
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and Service Contract Act126) and state (various state prevailing
wage statutes) levels. When a construction contractor or
subcontractor fails to pay its workers prevailing wages pursuant
to the Davis-Bacon Act, a worker has the right to recover those
prevailing wages, as well as file a qui tam lawsuit, for the false
claims the contractor made when it certified, pursuant to the
Act, that such prevailing wages were paid. If the court
determines that such false claims have been made, significant
civil penalties may be imposed on the contractor, from which a
portion may be recovered by the qui tam whistleblower.
Applying the qui tam provision in the context of home
care wage theft is less straightforward. Reimbursements to
home care agencies are calculated on a projected, episodic basis,
rather than on a retroactive reimbursement system. Therefore,
unlike with other instances of Medicare fraud or even home care
fraud such as that alleged in the Florence Bikundi case, it is
hard to ascertain specific or certain damages to the government.
In a case in which the government received its fair share of the
bargained-for rate, but the direct care worker did not, would the
government be seeking to “recover” a loss? And if not, how might
the qui tam reward—the 30% incentive considered key to the
FCA’s success—be calculated?
2. Judicial Interpretation
Recent amendments to the FCA have given it even
greater potential for application in the context of home care
wage theft.127 Prior to 2009, the FCA made liable a person who
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States . . . a false or fraudulent claim for
126 41 U.S.C. § 351 (2012). The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act
requires contractors and subcontractors performing services on prime contracts in
excess of $2,500 to pay service employees in various classes no less than the wage rates
and fringe benefits found prevailing in the locality, or the rates (including prospective
increases) contained in a predecessor contractor’s collective bargaining agreement. 41
U.S.C. § 351(a). The Department of Labor “issues wage determinations on a contract-
by-contract basis in response to specific requests from contracting agencies,” and
“[t]hese determinations are incorporated into the contract.” The McNamara-O’Hara
Service Contract Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/govcontracts/sca.htm
[http://perma.cc/K8U7-LHWN] (last updated Mar. 3, 2016) (“For contracts equal to or
less than $2,500, contractors are required to pay the federal minimum wage as
provided in Section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”).
127 See, e.g., Andrew E. Shipley, Trends in False Claim Act Litigation,
ASPATORE, May 2013, at *1, 2013 WL 1736890 (“Over the past few years, legislative
changes and court decisions affecting the False Claims Act have enlarged the pool of
potential plaintiffs, expanded the legal theories available to them, and weakened
potential defenses.”).
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payment or approval.”128 The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, however, expanded liability and the reach of the
FCA to subcontractors and indirect recipients of government
funds.129 Today, liability attaches when someone “knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”130 “False
claims” are those claims submitted pursuant to a contract or
other agreement “by means of false statements or other corrupt
or fraudulent conduct, or in violation of any statute or applicable
regulation.”131 The simplest type of false claim is a request for
payment for work or services that were not performed or
delivered, as in the Florence Bikundi case.
3. Applicability in Cases of Wage Theft
While the Bikundi case is relatively straightforward,
consider the case of Muriel Peters, a Maryland home care
worker and victim of wage theft. Ms. Peters is a certified nursing
assistant who worked for Early Health Care Giver, Inc. (EHCG),
a home care agency.132 She worked 119 hours every two-week
pay period providing in-home care for an elderly Montgomery
County woman.133 By participating in a Medicaid-funded
program, EHCG received $16 an hour for every hour of care it
provided, out of which it would pay Ms. Peters $12 an hour and
keep the remaining $4.134 This was true for every hour Ms.
Peters worked, even those hours above 40 each week,135 for
which (pending the DOL rules narrowing the companionship
definition, discussed in Part I) she should have been receiving
wages equal to time and a half.136 Qui tam liability in this case
hinged on whether EHCG’s failure to pay Ms. Peters violated
the FCA. If so, Ms. Peters, the woman she cares for, or a home
care worker organization could use the qui tam provision to blow
128 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2008).
129 United States ex rel. Tran v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 104, 116-
17 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
130 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012).
131 United States ex rel. Tran, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 117.
132 Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc., 97 A.3d 621, 623 (Md. 2014).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. (“EHCG paid Peters $12 per hour for all of her work, including the
hours she worked in excess of 40 hours per week.”).
136 Under Maryland’s Wage and Hour Law, MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-
402 (2015), and its Wage Payment and Collections Law, MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL.
§ 3-502 (2012) and MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-505 (2008), an employee like Ms.
Peters is guaranteed a minimum wage and overtime pay, to be paid regularly while
employed, and in full at the termination of employment. Peters, 97 A.3d at 624-25.
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the whistle on EHCG’s illegal underpayment—the wage theft—
and recover a portion of the damages.
To determine whether or not such a qui tam claim might be
successful in this case (and in cases of wage theft more generally),
the case of United States v. Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) provides guidance.137 In that case, the United
States alleged that a government contractor, SAIC, had
submitted false statements certifying its compliance with conflict-
of-interest provisions in its contract with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.138 SAIC’s claims for payments under the contract,
argued the government, were also false in light of the company’s
noncompliance.139 No party disputed that SAIC, like EHCG, had
performed the agreed-upon services and—according to the
testimony of trial witnesses—performed them well.140 Instead, the
court held that the government was required to prove its case via a
“certification theory,” which requires a plaintiff to establish that a
claim “rests on a false representation of compliance with an
applicable federal statute, federal regulation, or contractual term.
False certifications can be either express or implied.”141 Thus, at
issue was whether SAIC had made any material, express, false
certifications, and if not, whether SAIC was liable under the FCA
for false certifications that were only “implied.”
The contractor in SAIC argued that it could only be liable
under the FCA for an implied false certification of compliance
with a legal requirement if such compliance (with a statute, rule,
or contract) was expressly designated as a condition of payment.142
This was the standard the Second Circuit previously established
in Mikes v. Straus.143 Under the Mikes standard, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) would have to expressly
designate compliance with the FLSA or other applicable wage and
hour laws as a condition of reimbursement for a plaintiff to
successfully argue that wage theft is a violation of the FCA. The
district court in SAIC, however, in rejecting the contractor’s
arguments that its payment invoices contained no factually false
137 United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC I), 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
138 Id. at 1263.
139 Id.
140 United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC II), 958 F. Supp. 2d 53,
77 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“There is evidence in the record that SAIC provided ‘extremely
high’ quality work to the NRC and that the NRC continued to use SAIC’s work even
after it discovered the alleged OCIs.”).
141 SAIC I, 626 F.3d at 1266 (citation omitted).
142 Id. at 1271.
143 Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
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statements about the services performed or false express
certifications of compliance with any of the contract provisions,
rejected the Mikes standard and instead allowed the government
to proceed on a theory of “implied false certification.”144
This lower threshold for liability would require a plaintiff
to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that compliance
with the legal requirement in question is material to the
government’s decision to pay.”145 In other words, SAIC was liable
because the government might not have paid SAIC had it known
of its potential conflicts of interest (i.e., its implied certification
with the conflict policy in its contract). This approach follows the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ approach to the conditions under
which FCA liability attaches for implied false certifications.146
The court concluded in SAIC that the government had presented
unrebutted evidence that SAIC’s violation of the no-conflict
provisions constituted “information critical to the [government’s]
decision to pay.”147
Applying the SAIC court’s approach to wage theft, if there
is a requirement in its contract with Medicare or Medicaid that a
home care provider comply with laws (e.g., FLSA), a court will
find that at each request for reimbursement, the employer is
implicitly certifying to the government that it is indeed
compliant.148 Compliance with wage and hour laws would be
“critical to the government’s decision to pay” for at least four
reasons: the government’s obligation to protect the legal rights of
the employees themselves, the loss of potential tax revenues owed
to the government as a result of certain forms of wage theft, the
potential for wage theft to diminish the quality of care received by
other taxpayers, and the potential for such wage theft, in the
144 SAIC II, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (explaining that under the implied
certification theory, “a claim is false if ‘the contractor withheld information about its
noncompliance with material contractual requirements’”).
145 SAIC I, 626 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis added).
146 See United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d
1163, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 2010); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993,
997-98 (9th Cir. 2010).
147 See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49-51
(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting United States v. TDCMgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 426-27 (2002)).
148 By requiring that the government prove that compliance was an express
condition precedent in implied certification cases, the court in Mikes made clear that in
the context of healthcare fraud, the FCA had the potential to become a “blunt
instrument to enforce compliance with all medical regulations.” Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699-
700. Unlike the massive web of healthcare regulations ranging from Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement to treatment protocols to patient protections, the laws and
regulations at issue in allegations of wage theft are very few and are central to the
operation of the home care provider.
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aggregate, to significantly destabilize a critically important and
expanding industry.
Ideally, the Medicaid and Medicare programs would avoid
the unsettled circuit approaches to implied certification by making
compliance by home care contractors with federal wage and hour
laws an express condition for reimbursement for home care
services. Even under an implied certification framework, however,
a home care agency that submits a request for Medicare
reimbursement at the same time that it has failed to pay its
workers legally mandated overtime could be held to be submitting
“false or fraudulent” requests. This is true even if the amounts
requested are neither directly linked to a certain hourly rate by the
worker (i.e., the agency may not be literally “pocketing” a difference
between what the government is paying and what it is paying the
worker for services) nor expressly designated in the contract (i.e.,
compliance with wage and hour law) as a condition of payment.
Provided an express or implied certification theory is
applied in a case of wage theft, such as the Muriel Peters
scenario, a second issue is the calculation of damages. When a
home care employer is reimbursed for care—even high quality
care—that is provided to the consumer (unlike in the Bikundi
case, where no care was actually provided), what is the loss to the
federal government? Medicare or Medicaid has paid the exact
same amount it would pay to an employer who does comply with
minimum wage and hour standards. The hourly wages received
by home care workers account for about half of the rates paid or
received by employers.149 At issue, then, is whether employers are
unjustly enriched by failing to pay mandated minimum wages or
overtime rates, as calculated by the difference between the wage
paid to workers and the value of the services for which the agency
has been reimbursed.
This was a question for the SAIC court, given that SAIC
had, by all accounts, provided the type of high quality services for
which the government had contracted. The only issue was that
SAIC was not in compliance with conflict-of-interest provisions in
the underlying contract, a contract violation for which damages
were difficult to establish. The government argued that had it
known about the conflicts of interest, it would have made no
149 The average rate paid by state Medicaid programs to agencies providing
personal care services was $17.73 per hour in 2010. In comparison, the median wage
received by home care workers (under both private and public pay arrangements) was $9.40
per hour. PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., COMPARING COST OF PERSONAL CARE
SERVICES AND CAREGIVER PAY 1-2 (2012), http://www.phinational.org/sites/phinational.org/
files/clearinghouse/pcs-rates-and-worker-wages.pdf [http://perma.cc/NQM4-FA69].
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payments whatsoever for the consulting advice and technical
assistance that it received. At trial, the jury was instructed to
calculate as damages the amount that the government paid to
SAIC over what it would have paid had it known about the
conflicts of interest.150 The jury was explicitly instructed not to
calculate the value of the services provided.151
Damages in FCA cases, like most traditional contract
remedies, are intended to put the government in the position it
would have been in had it not been for the defendant’s false
claims.152 In calculating the amount of damages in an FCA case,
courts typically use one of two frameworks: “benefit-of-the-
bargain”153 or “out-of-pocket-cost.”154 In a case where the court
applies the benefit-of-the-bargain standard, damages will equal
the difference between the market value of the contracted-for
goods or services and the market value of those goods or services
as actually received.155 There are cases, however, in which it is
difficult to ascertain the market value of the goods or services, in
which case the court will assess damages as the difference
between the price the government paid (its “out of pocket costs”)
and the actual value to the government of what it received.156
Under both of these approaches, however, it is possible to
conclude that the government is owed no damages when a
company provides the contracted-for service, but for some other
reason (e.g., noncompliance with a statute, rule, or contract
provision) is liable under the FCA. This is often the case with
150
The damages that the United States is entitled to recover under the False
Claims Act are the amount of money that the government paid out by reason
of the false claims over and above what it would have paid out had SAIC not
made the false claims. . . . Your calculations of damages should be limited to
determining what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission paid to [SAIC] over
and above what the NRC would have paid had it known of SAIC’s
organizational conflicts of interest. Your calculation of damages should not
attempt to account for the value of services, if any, that SAIC conferred upon
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
SAIC I, 626 F.3d at 1278.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 United States ex rel. Feldman v. Van Gorp, 697 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2012).
154 United States ex rel.Roby v. Boeing, 73 F. Supp. 2d 897, 906-07 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
155 See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 316 n.13 (1976); United
States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302 F.3d 637, 646-47 (6th Cir. 2002).
156 SAIC I, 626 F.3d at 1279 (“[I]f the value that conforming goods or services
would have had is impossible to determine, then the fact-finder bases damages on the
amount the government actually paid minus the value of the goods or services the
government received or used.”); United States ex rel. Feldman v. Van Gorp, 697 F.3d
78, 88 (2d Cir. 2012).
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FCA claims triggered by the Anti-Kickback Statute. Healthcare
providers that accept kickbacks are ineligible to participate in
Medicare and Medicaid and are subject to liability under the
FCA. How should damages be calculated when the government
has received the exact same quality of care for which it bargained,
but the doctor made more money than he should have because of
the kickback? One argument is that there are no damages, since
the government received the benefit of its bargain. The moral
hazard inherent in adopting this argument is clear. Just as a lack
of wage theft enforcement incentivizes unscrupulous employers to
gain a competitive advantage by breaking the law, in the absence
of any real damages, doctors would be incentivized to violate the
Anti-Kickback Statute. For this reason, in cases such as these,
courts have found that all government outlays under the contract
are recoverable as damages.157
Thus, even in those cases where the government may not
have suffered an actual loss or “economic damages,” courts have
imposed “damages” to prevent a defendant from benefiting from its
misconduct.158 The court in SAIC was reluctant, however, to
extend this equitable principle as far as the government would
have liked, which would have been to impose the total amount it
had paid to SAIC as damages. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the government would be required to present some evidence “that
the services it received were truly worthless,” and the jury could
determine, in light of the contractor’s evidence, whether that was
true.159 This would appear to shift the focus of the FCA damages
inquiry away from an earlier line of cases that attempted to
remedy contractors’ unjust enrichment and instead require
provable financial injury.
In the context of home care, there are several stakeholders
who might serve as relators. Clearly, the home care worker
herself would be best positioned to report any underpayment of
wages or misclassification of employment status. But, for reasons
157 For example, in United States v. Rogan, the Seventh Circuit held:
Nor do we think it important that most of the patients for which claims were
submitted received some medical care—perhaps all the care reflected in the
claim forms. . . . [Defendant] Edgewater did not furnish any medical service
to the United States. The government offers a subsidy (from the patients’
perspective, a form of insurance), with conditions. When the conditions are
not satisfied, nothing is due Thus the entire amount that Edgewater
received . . . must be paid back.
517 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
158 Id.
159 SAIC I, 626 F.3d at 1279-80.
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discussed in Part III, she may be reluctant, unwilling, or unable
to come forward. An alternative, for which the home health care
industry may be uniquely positioned, would be to incentivize
individual consumers of such services and members of their
families to report wage theft experienced by their care provider.
Though sometimes characterized as adversarial, the
interests of individual consumers or their family members are often
aligned with those of the care provider.160 Families and consumers
want to ensure high-quality, consistently provided care.
Combatting wage theft (and indeed, advocating for higher wages
and benefits more generally) is therefore in the interest of
consumers and families, at least as it relates to services paid for
by Medicare and contracted through an agency.161 The consumer
and her family members are often well positioned to discover
wage theft. A consumer’s son may develop an individual
relationship with the home care employee providing care to his
mother. He, unlike those engaged in public workplace enforcement,
may have significant opportunities to talk with the home care
worker in private and outside the scrutiny of the agency-employer.
Incentivizing private persons (i.e., workers, consumers,
and family members) to blow the whistle on wage theft through
the use of qui tam litigation could help mitigate the limitations on
public enforcement. Given the low wages endemic to the home
care industry, however, any recovery that is based solely on a
percentage of a worker’s owed wages may not be a sufficient
financial reward. Still, unlike in the securities or tax arena,
whistleblowers of home health care fraud often have a significant
nonmonetary incentive to report abuse: ensuring a high degree of
quality care. Incentivizing or encouraging underpaid or
misclassified workers to bring a qui tam action under the FCA (or,
as Professor Pandya suggests, reporting such cases of wage theft
160 The Caring Across Generations campaign has brought together worker
organizations, consumer advocates, and families, including
AFSCME and the SEIU to 9 to 5, the Alliance of Retired Americans, the
National Day Laborer Organizing Network and the YWCA. Labor Secretary
Hilda Solis, the daughter of a domestic worker, addressed the 700-strong
crowd: “America must be a nation where dignity and respect are afforded
equally and rightfully to caregivers and to loved ones alike.”
Laura Flanders, A Campaign About Caring, NATION, Apr. 30, 2012, at 21, 22. Ai-jen Poo,
Caring Across Generations’s director, was recently awarded a MacArthur Fellowship.
Elizabeth O’Brien, Macarthur ‘Genius’ Tackles the U.S. Elder-Care Problem,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:01 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/macarthur-
genius-tackles-the-us-elder-care-problem-2015-02-12 [http://perma.cc/F6BF-PZJ4].
161 Instances of wage theft by self-paying (i.e., not publicly funded or
subsidized) individual employers would not likely trigger FCA liability.
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to the taxing authority as a tax informant)162 could serve as a new
approach to combatting the problem of wage theft.
If, however, qui tam litigation in the context of wage theft
is foreclosed by federal courts’ interpretations of implied
certification requirements or by the calculation of damages,
equitable arguments remain. That the receipt of federal dollars
should impose additional responsibilities, including fiduciary
duties, on home care providers is an argument rooted in
principles of unjust enrichment and the collateral impacts of wage
theft on both quality of care and local economies.
B. Fiduciary Duty Framework
A second theory of liability that makes wage theft in the
home care industry akin to “public larceny” considers whether the
entrustment of public monies, through the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, makes home care employers fiduciaries of these funds. If
so, wage theft—underpayment or misclassification—would
constitute a breach of those fiduciary duties, giving rise to a claim
(by the taxpayers or, derivatively, the employee) for civil
damages. This section explores whether fiduciary theory might
provide a basis for additional deterrence of wage theft in the home
care industry and help stabilize systems of care for the elderly,
disabled, and their families.
Using a fiduciary duty framework in the context of wage
theft sheds greater light on the full spectrum of wage theft
victims. Unlike the purely private sector, home health care is an
industry fully supported by public monies provided by individual
taxpayers who expect to benefit in various ways from the industry.
Whether as consumers, family members who would otherwise
themselves have to provide care to loved ones, or residents of
communities that rely on employer tax contributions for adequate
162 Looking at this question through the lens of taxation, Professor Pandya
articulates a basis for wage theft as a trigger for tax liability under federal law. See
generally Sachin S. Pandya, Tax Liability for Wage Theft, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 113 (2012).
Employers who fail to pay minimum wages or misclassify employees as independent
contractors, Pandya argues, pay less than the fair market value for the services their
employees provide. Id. at 120. That difference in value is therefore additional income
unreported by the employer. Id. at 142. The IRS entices people to report tax fraud by
offering between 15% and 30% of the back taxes and other funds ultimately recovered by
the IRS. Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah Webber, Paying the IRS Whistleblower: A
Critical Analysis of Collected Proceeds, 32 VA. TAX REV. 77, 85-86 (2012). Similar
incentives are provided by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, which offers whistleblowers between 10% and 30% of monies recovered as a result of
tips about insider trading and other violations of securities law. Consumer Financial
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1842, 1957.
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revenue, the beneficiaries of home care are numerous. When wage
theft occurs in the home care industry, therefore, its victims
extend beyond the individual care worker. A fiduciary duty
framework would acknowledge this complex relationship between
employer, consumer, care provider, and taxpayer.
While fiduciary relationships appear in many legal
environments (e.g., trusts, wills, corporate governance), outside
of the proscribed statutory frameworks (e.g., ERISA), fiduciary
duty theory has not been applied in the employment context.
Fiduciary duties may broadly be categorized as either duties of
loyalty or duties of care.163 A fiduciary relationship is predicated
on public policy and service—a fiduciary provides services in
exchange for trust.164 While a fiduciary is arguably restrained by
these duties, the demand for his or her services is arguably
enhanced as a result of those commitments to care and loyalty.165
While this system is designed to benefit all parties in the
relationship, “[t]he private law does not apply fiduciary duties
without first making an effort to determine whether the
relationship at issue is truly a fiduciary one.”166
Whereas traditional fraud is a type of deception, fraud
within a fiduciary relationship (sometimes referred to as
constructive fraud) is a type of betrayal. Since fiduciary fraud
cannot exist unless there is first a fiduciary relationship, a
determination of whether a fiduciary relationship exists in the
home care relationship is necessary. If indeed there is such a
relationship, the next determination is how best to calibrate the
underlying fiduciary duties. In a fiduciary relationship, fraud is
committed when the legal duties owed by the fiduciary (in this
case, the home care employer) to the beneficiary (here, taxpayers)
are violated by the fiduciary (arguably by violating FLSA and
other legal workplace standards). There will be no fraud unless the
employer uses the relationship and the taxpayers’ reliance on the
relationship to betray the taxpayer. It is, therefore, the fiduciary
relationship that is at the heart of any fiduciary fraud case.
163 TAMAR FRANKEL, Fiduciary Duties, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). As noted by Judge
Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, “Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have
no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the
same way, as other contractual undertakings.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993).
164 FRANKEL, supra note 163, at 127.
165 Id. at 128.
166 Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 93 (2013).
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To succeed on a claim of fiduciary fraud, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant did in fact have a fiduciary duty and
that the defendant did in fact breach that duty by taking
advantage of the position of trust in order to harm the plaintiff.167
In the case of Medicare providers, such as home care agencies,
their particular duties and obligations owed to various
stakeholders are set forth in an agreement with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.168 This contract stipulates that the
agency will perform certain services in accordance with statutes
and regulations and in return will be eligible to receive
reimbursement from the Secretary for those services. Though not a
fiduciary by statute, because CMS holds itself out to the public as a
“trusted fiduciary,” some have argued that such a relationship
could reasonably be construed.169 Arguably, if a home care agency
receives funds that were allocated by CMS with the expectation
that certain minimum wages would be paid, failure (especially a
willful failure) to actually pay those minimum wages could
constitute a breach of a derivative fiduciary duty, should one exist.
While not directly characterizing the relationship between
home care employers, employees, and taxpayers as fiduciary in
nature, Congress has taken steps to root out fraud in the health
care industry by creating criminal and civil penalties for providers
that overbill or otherwise defraud Medicare and Medicaid.170
167 121 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 1 (2011).
168 Brief of Quality Reimbursement Services, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 2, Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013)
(No. 11-1231) (agreement mandated by section 1866 of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc).
169 Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1983)). CMS
“often refer[s] in various public issuances to its fiduciary responsibility to make
appropriate payments from the trust fund.” Id. at 11-12. “The mandate for
implementing the Medicare program tasks CMS with fiduciary responsibilities that
require us to develop an effective and efficient payment system . . . .” Id. at 12 (citing
71 Fed. Reg. 27798, 27884 (May 12, 2006)); 72 Fed. Reg. 47130, 47247, Aug. 22, 2007
(noting the secretary’s “fiduciary responsibility to the Medicare trust fund to ensure
that Medicare pays only for covered services”); 71 Fed. Reg. 47870, 47908, Aug. 18,
2006 (stating that CMS has “a fiduciary responsibility to administer the trust fund in
order to provide quality care for our beneficiaries”).
170 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (Supp. 1996) predates these more recent efforts and
governs false statements related to health care matters. Under this provision, whoever
knowingly and willfully . . . falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme or device a material fact; or . . . makes any materially false, fictitious
or fraudulent statements or representations, or uses any materially false
writing or document [with knowledge of the falsity], . . . in connection with
the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items or services
is liable for a fine, imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. Id. It is arguable
that the existence of this more specific section prohibits prosecution under the False
Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012), for the same conduct.
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Recognizing the impacts of health care fraud on the costs of care,
Congress passed the Criminal Health Care Fraud Statute,171
which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully make any false
statement or representation of material fact in any application for
any benefit or payment under any health care benefit programs.172
Moreover, the federal crime of Theft or Embezzlement in
Connection with Health Care173 makes anyone found to be
“knowingly and willfully converting or intentionally misapplying
the assets of a health care benefit program” liable for a fine or
imprisonment of not more than 10 years (or both).174 Reframing
home care wage theft as a “misapplication” of federal health care
program funds, even if not originally contemplated under the
statute, could support an argument that such a misapplication
has given rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.
Perhaps a more cogent fiduciary argument would
characterize Medicare and Medicaid funding as a trust fund, with
the government and taxpayers as settlors, home care employers
as trustees, and employees and consumers as third-party
beneficiaries.175 Taxpayers fund the trust with the understanding
that the government will allocate the funds as needed for the
purpose of providing healthcare to the elderly, disabled, and
infirm.176 Home care employers would then have fiduciary
171 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012).
172 As used in the statute, any “health care benefit program” includes “any
public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical
benefit, item, or service is provided to any individual, and includes any individual or
entity who is providing a medical benefit, item, or service for which payment may be
made under the plan or contract.” 18 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
173 18 U.S.C. § 669 (1994).
174 Id. In addition to possible criminal liability, providers are also exposed to
substantial civil liability for health care fraud under the Civil False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012), and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7
(2012). Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2012), the Civil Monetary Penalties Law,
establishes an administrative action that may be pursued in lieu of a criminal or civil
action. The law provides that any person presenting or causing the presentation of a
claim for Medicaid or Medicare benefits for medical items or services that the provider
knows or should know is false is subject to a penalty of $10,000 per item or service. Id.
In addition, the provider is “subject to an assessment of not more than 3 times the
amount claimed for each item.” Id. The provider is also subject to being excluded from
the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Id.
175 See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 435, 438-45 (1998)
(outlining the relationships at the heart of trust law and discussing in particular
whether trust law may, in certain contexts, help to “facilitat[e] an important set of
socially beneficial transactions that would be difficult or impossible without trust law”).
176 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 625-31 (1995). Professor Langbein notes that while the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts characterizes the trust as “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property,” trusts
are, in fact, contracts in which the parties negotiate the terms and distribution of assets. Id.
at 627 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTRUSTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
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obligations to ensure that the monies received from the settlors
are distributed to the employee beneficiaries in accordance with
law. Any failure (again, especially a knowing and willful failure)
to ensure that the monies are legally distributed to home care
workers would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty by the home
care employer.
This type of framework is consistent with the goals of a
fiduciary society, which emphasizes “cooperation and identity of
interest pursuant to acceptable but imposed standards.”177
Cooperation among home care employers, employees, and the
government is critical to ensuring a high quality of care for
consumers. A society based on fiduciary relationships “permits
the government to moderate between altruistic goals and
individualistic, selfish desires, as well as between the social goal
of increasing the common welfare and the individual desire to
appropriate more than a ‘fair share.’”178 In the context of enforcing
minimum standards in an industry quite necessary for “the
common welfare,” this proposed fiduciary framework could help
ensure the highest quality of care for consumers by compelling
increased compliance with federal standards for home care
workers already doing their “fair share” for unfair wages.
C. Medicare/Medicaid Exclusion
The threat of potential exclusion from participation in
Medicaid and Medicare may be one of the most effective ways to
deter wage and hour violations in the home care industry. In
other industries, local and state governments have begun to enact
legislation that explicitly excludes contractors that engage in
wage theft from receiving governmental contracts. Houston’s
wage theft ordinance, enacted in 2013, which restricts the city
from doing business with known wage theft offenders, established
a public database to track offenders.179 Other cities and counties
across the country have begun to respond in similar ways, as local
budgets bear the brunt of wage theft’s collateral financial
impacts.180 Cook County, Illinois, recently became the largest
177 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 802 (1983).
178 Id.
179 CITY OF HOUS., TEX., WAGE THEFTORDINANCENO. 2013 (2013).
180 For a detailed examination of wage theft ordinances and campaigns across
the country, see NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT (2011), www.nelp.org/page/-
/Justice/2011/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/3RH8-A9VP]. These include,
for example, providing for treble damages for minimum wage violations (Arizona, Idaho,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Ohio), lengthening the amount of time that plaintiffs
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county to pass such an ordinance, which not only precludes
government contracts for companies that engage in wage theft
but also excludes them from obtaining business licenses or
property tax incentives.181
On the federal level, the Congressional Progressive
Caucus (CPC) has attempted, with moderate success, to amend
the House appropriations acts in order to disqualify from
receiving federal contracts any corporation that violated the
FLSA in the last five years.182 As the CPC stated, “No working
American should ever worry that her employer might steal a part
of her paycheck, especially if she works for a contractor paid by
the federal government.”183 While a home care worker’s employer
may not be a “federal contractor,” her paycheck is no less the
product of public monies, and the wage theft is no less a breach of
the public’s trust.184 Participation in the Medicare program on the
part of providers is voluntary.185 Like federal contractors,
Medicare providers voluntarily agree to perform services in the
manner required by their agreements with the government in
exchange for payment.186
have to bring wage violations claims (California, Florida, New York, Oregon, Washington,
Ohio, Arizona, and New Mexico), revoking business licenses for employers who engage in
wage theft, and enacting stronger criminal penalties. Id. at 20, 23, 31, 34.
181 Alejandra Cancino, Cook County OKs Ordinance to Combat Wage Theft, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Feb. 10, 2015, 4:38 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/breaking/ct-
cook-county-wage-theft-0211-biz-20150210-story.html [http://perma.cc/2AJJ-STCF].
182 Currently, the House has passed the Transportation, Housing and Urban
Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, the Energy andWater Development and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, and the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act with these
wage theft amendments attached. Brady Meixell, Congress Takes Steps to Stop Wage
Theft by Federal Contractor, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 28, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.epi.org/
blog/congress-takes-steps-stop-wage-theft-federal/ [http://perma.cc/JRR3-JU92].
183 See Press Release, Congressional Progressive Caucus, House of
Representatives Moves to Protect Workers (June 10, 2014), http://cpc.grijalva.house.gov/
press-releases/house-of-representatives-moves-to-protect-workers1/ [http://perma.cc/7ATE
-79WL].
184 A federal contractor is defined, generally speaking, as
any business or organization that (1) holds a single Federal contract,
subcontract, or Federally assisted construction contract in excess of $10,000.00;
(2) has Federal contract or subcontracts that combined total in excess of
$10,000.00 in any 12-month period; or (3) holds Government bills of lading,
serves as a depository of Federal funds, or is an issuing and paying agency for
U.S. savings bonds and notes in any amount will be subject to requirements
under one or more of the laws enforced by OFCCP.
Jurisdiction, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/
juristn.htm [http://perma.cc/6TJD-UAWK] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
185 Queen City HomeHealth Care Co. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 236, 247 (6th Cir. 1992).
186 See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1076-77 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that Medicare provider agreements are executory contracts, which like other
government contracts are subject to assumption or rejection by a debtor under the
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Perhaps the most actionable and enforceable solution to
the issue of wage theft by home health care agencies would be to
statutorily exclude such employers from participation in Medicaid
and Medicare. Similar to the use of debarment proceedings to
enforce compliance in the federal contracting arena, the
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector
General has broad powers of exclusion.187 Given how dependent
most home care agencies are on reimbursement from these
programs, the mere threat of exclusion may prove a powerful
weapon in the hands of home care workers and their advocates.
According to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8(a)(3), a person (or
agency) who knowingly engages in financial fraud as a payee
under Medicare or Medicaid is subject to a civil monetary penalty
of up to $5,000, as well as assessments of not more than twice the
amount of the payments so fraudulently received, and possible
exclusion from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and other
federal health care programs.188 Mandatory grounds for exclusion
include a conviction for program-related crimes, or in other words,
Bankruptcy Code); Richey Manor, Inc. v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 130, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(noting that the provider agreement is a contract between the provider and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services); Delta Health Grp., Inc. v. United States Dep’t
of Health and Human Servs., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (“The
provider agreement, at bottom, acts as a contract with the federal government in which
the provider agrees to furnish quality nursing services to Medicare beneficiaries in
compliance with all the applicable federal and state regulations.”).
187 The Office of Inspector General was established in the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services to identify and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse in the
Department’s programs and to promote efficiency and economy in departmental
operations. The Office carries out this mission through a nationwide program of audits,
inspections, and investigations. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTORGEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN ON THE EFFECT OF EXCLUSION FROM
PARTICIPATION IN FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS 1 (2013), http://oig.hhs.gov/
exclusions/files/sab-05092013.pdf [http://perma.cc/8YAC-LXRA]. “The enactment of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Public Law 104-1911, in
1996,” as well as the “Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act
of 2003 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, expanded OIG’s
exclusion waiver authority.” Id. at 4-5.
188 The precise language is as follows:
(3) Any person (including an organization, agency, or other entity) who,
having received, while acting in the capacity of a representative payee
pursuant to section 405(j), 1007, or 1383(a)(2) of this title, a payment under
subchapter II, VIII, or XVI of this chapter for the use and benefit of another
individual, converts such payment, or any part thereof, to a use that such
person knows or should know is other than for the use and benefit of such
other individual shall be subject to, in addition to any other penalties that
may be prescribed by law, a civil money penalty of not more than $5,000 for
each such conversion. Such person shall also be subject to an assessment, in
lieu of damages sustained by the United States resulting from the conversion,
of not more than twice the amount of any payments so converted.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8(a)(3) (2012).
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crimes related to the delivery of an item or service.189 In the case
of wage theft, an employer may argue that any payment to an
employee for services is ancillary to the actual provision of such
services (i.e., it is not a program-related crime). On the other
hand, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) makes permissive the exclusion of
an individual that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
determines, in an administrative proceeding, has committed an
act proscribed by certain statutes, such as the Anti-Kickback
Statute.190
Section 1320a-7 would compel the mandatory exclusion of
a home care provider from any federal health care program191
upon conviction of health care fraud “consisting of a felony related
to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility,
or other financial misconduct.”192 The Secretary may exclude
providers for the same conduct that results in a misdemeanor
conviction. Whether home care workers, consumers, or their
advocates may leverage this statutory exclusion to enforce wage
theft remains to be seen. Arguably, the receipt by employers of
federal funds for the express purpose of providing home-based
medical care, when those funds are not disbursed in accordance
with law, is a form of theft. If, however, wage theft is not
recognized as theft in connection with “health care fraud,” and
given the existing limitations on FLSA enforcement, it may be
necessary to amend the statute to clarify that a conviction or
administrative finding of wage theft constitutes permissive
grounds for exclusion.
The effects of exclusion are severe and longstanding.193 If,
following exclusion, a home care provider were to continue to
participate in a federal health care program, as Ms. Bikundi did,
that person or organization may also be civilly liable under the
189 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1); see Anderson v. Thompson, 311 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1125 (D. Kan. 2004).
190 Anderson, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (holding that 15 years was an
acceptable and mandatory duration of exclusion for a hospital executive convicted of
violating the Anti-Kickback Statute).
191 A “Federal health care program” is defined as “any plan or program that
provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government . . . [or a] State
health care program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f). “Among the most significant Federal
health care programs are Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, and the veterans’ programs.”
U.S. DEP’T OFHEALTH ANDHUMAN SERVS., supra note 187, at 6-9.
192 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(3).
193 An excluded person who submits a claim for payment to a federal health
care program or causes such a claim to be submitted may be subject to civil monetary
penalties of $10,000 for each claimed item or service furnished during the period that
the person was excluded. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1128(a)(1)(D) (2012); U.S.
DEP’T OFHEALTH ANDHUMAN SERVS., supra note 187, at 6-9.
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FCA for knowingly presenting or causing to be presented a false
or fraudulent claim for payment.194 The severe consequences of
exclusion contrast starkly with the relatively minor punishments
for wage theft generally, which is why such a strategy may prove
more effective than traditional statutory enforcement. Putting
employers on notice that wage theft violations could permanently
disrupt their business operations would create a more level
playing field among these agencies and would deter employers
from engaging in a “race to the bottom” to comply with minimum
wage and overtime laws.
CONCLUSION
The number of home care jobs in the United States is
projected to grow five times faster than jobs in all other
industries. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
United States will need one million new home care workers by
2022.195 As the industry expands and constitutes a larger share of
the nation’s overall workforce, enforcing workplace standards will
have tremendous implications. Home care workers, who care for
the vulnerable, are themselves some of the most vulnerable in the
contemporary American workforce. Often isolated geographically,
socially, and politically, they work inside private homes and
outside of public view or governmental inspection. Wage theft in
this federally subsidized industry should be regarded as public
larceny, a crime that produces multiple and varied victims,
including workers, care recipients, taxpayers, and family
members. When wage theft goes unchecked, ethical employers
who comply with legal standards are forced to compete with
unscrupulous competitors whose law breaking affords them an
economic advantage. Poor workplace standards create high rates
of employee turnover and low morale, which threatens the quality
of care for aging and disabled populations.
Fake palm trees purchased with false invoices for phony
services, at a cost to federal taxpayers of millions of dollars,
clearly warrants the resources of federal investigation and
prosecution. Punishing the perpetrators of fraud, deterring future
schemes, and recovering stolen public monies are all necessary for
the long-term viability of the home care industry. But the
employer who illegally underpays its genuine employees with
194 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012).
195 Employment Projections, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://data.bls.gov/projections/
occupationProj [http://perma.cc/R6L2-BPE7] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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public monies when the employees provide real services is no less
of a criminal, and no less of a threat to the industry, than one who
fabricates care completely.
Given the persistent limitations on federal and state law
in this context, reducing wage theft in the home care industry
requires both traditional and nontraditional (as well as individual
and collective, “bottom-up” and “top-down”) mechanisms. Creative
approaches to curbing violations, such as those proposed in this
article—qui tam litigation, employer fiduciary duties, and
Medicaid/Medicare exclusion—could benefit an ever-growing slice
of the nation’s most vulnerable workers and consumers of care.
